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For twelve years, El Salvador was mired in a civil war that polarized all segments of 
Salvadoran society and that reflected deeply rooted economic, social, and political problems. 
Yet, El Salvador negotiated an end to its war in 1991. Why did these negotiations succeed? 
How did the peace process help drive the broader progress in political development and 
democratization? To what extend can the Salvadoran experience serve as an example for 
other nations, and offer broader insights into theories of comparative politics and political 
development? 
This thesis argues that three related developments facilitated the peace process of El 
Salvador. After a bloody decade of war that began in 1979, both the Salvadoran government 
and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) came to recognize that 
neither side could hope to win through force. This recognition spurred an unprecedented 
willingness on both sides to negotiate. Second, changes in the international system 
encouraged negotiations, particularly as political shifts within the Soviet Union dried up the 
FMLN's sources of outside support. 
But many of these promises of assistance have not been kept. El Salvador faces 
severe economic and political problems, and these problems could impede full 
implementation of the peace accords. Ultimately, continued democratization in El Salvador- 
and elsewhere in Latin America -- can only be based on political commitment, social justice, 
and economic growth. The international community can help facilitate the resolution of 
conflicts and aid the process of democratization. Nevertheless, the Salvadoran case 
suggests that the most critical prerequisites are the shared recognition that violence cannot 
provide victory, and that compromise and consensus is in the interest of all parties to the 
conflict. 
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Nowhere in Latin America has political change been so dramatic as in El Salvador. 
Twelve years of bloody civil war (1979-1991) polarized all segments of Salvadoran society. 
Yet in 1991, El Salvador resolved that conflict not on the battlefield but over a negotiating 
table. El Salvador found a path from armed conflict and military rule to relative peace under 
a democratic system. Officials of other Latin American nations facing similar internal 
challenges (including Guatemala and Colombia) have expressed interest in learning from the 
Salvadoran experience, and adapting elements of the Salvadoran peace process to suit their 
own specific needs and circumstances. What were the key elements of the peace process 
of El Salvador? To what extent can the Salvadoran experience serve as a example for other 
nations, and offer broader insights into theories of comparative politics and political 
development? 
This thesis has three objectives. First, it offers a detailed and systematic analysis of 
the negotiations meetings between the government of El Salvador and the Frente Fabarunho 
Marti para la Liberation National (FMLN - Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front). This 
account relies on original source materials and fills a significant gap in the English language 
literature on El Salvador. Second, the thesis analyzes how the peace process helped drive 
the larger process of political development and democratization in El Salvador. Third, the 
thesis examines the broader lessons illuminated by the negotiation and implementation 
process, so that other nations' scholars and policy-makers can borrow from the Salvadoran 
example to meet their own particular problems. While the Salvadoran example offers some 
significant successes, it also highlights some critical hurdles to democratization and conflict 
resolution. 
This thesis argues that in El Salvador -- and elsewhere in Latin America - the 
survival and consolidation of a nation's democratic norms depend on all segments of society 
and their capacity to adapt to changes taking place inside their nation and the willingness of 
political society to compromise and seek consensus. Ultimately, democracy is based on 
political freedom, social justice, and economic progress. Mutual recognition between civil 
society, political society, and the State is necessary to enhance the consolidation of 
democracy. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter I is an introduction, including 
political theory, which follows. Chapter II provides a historical background from the 19TH 
Century to the escalation of the Civil War (1979-1984). This chapter describes the factors 
that promoted the start of the civil war, the sequence of events from 1979 to 1984 that 
sparked the beginning of the peace talks, and uses Stepan's theory to explain how El 
Salvador moved from a military regime (1932-1979) to a free elected government (1979- 
1984). 
Chapter III examines the peace process during former Presidents Jose Napoleon 
Duarte (1984-1989) and Alfredo Cristiani (1989-1992). An appendix shows the sequence of 
negotiation meetings from 1984 to 1992. This chapter also analyzes how different national 
and international variables influenced the outcome of each negotiation period. The chapter 
uses Günther and Higley's theory to describe how the government and the FMLN reached 
an elite settlement. 
Chapter IV analyzes the implementation process of the peace accords from 1992 to 
the present. This chapter also examines: 1) the phases of the implementation process; 2) 
the role that national and international actors played in the process; and 3) the nature of the 
problems affecting the implementation of the pending accords. 
Chapter V discusses the future of El Salvador. It uses Dahl's theory to show how 
El Salvador's democracy evolved from 1932 to 1995, and examines several problems that 
need to be resolved to strengthen El Salvador's democratic consolidation. Chapter VI 
provides an overview of the relationship between the accomplishment of the peace accords 
and El Salvador's consolidation of democracy. 
B. THEORY 
The literature on comparative politics offers a large number of theories that attempt 
to account for democratic transition and consolidation. Three approaches offer especially 
valuable (if only partially adequate) framework for assessing El Salvador's case. These 
approaches are described in Alfred Stepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratizaton: Theoretical 
and Comparative Considerations;"1 John Higley and Richard Günther, Elites and Democratic 
'Alfred Stepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations" in Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe;2   and   Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: 
Participation and Opposition3 
Stepan proposed eight different paths that could lead to the end of authoritarian 
regimes and to the process of fedemocratization. He delineated several complex causes 
(economic, historical, political, and international) that could influence the outcome of the 
redemocratization process. Successful democratization, with or without these causes, may 
require the simultaneous pursuit of several paths. His eight paths are divided into three 
different parts: 
I. Warfare and conquest play an integral role in redemocratization. 
Path One. Internal Restoration after External Reconquest. 
Redemocratization takes place when a functioning democracy, conquered in 
war, restores democracy after the conqueror is defeated by external forces 
(e.g., The Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark during WWII). 
Path Two. Internal Reformulation. Redemocratization takes place 
after a conqueror has been defeated largely by external forces. There is 
much greater potential for political instability and for rightist reaction or leftist 
structural change than path one (e.g., Greece and France). 
Path Three. Externally Monitored Installation. Democratic powers 
defeat an authoritarian regime and play a major role in the formulation and 
implementation of a democratic regime. The major political weakness of this 
path is its foreign imposition. It will appear to have a lack of legitimacy not 
found in Path One. There is power to dismantle the military and political 
institutions and other features of the authoritarian state apparatus (e.g., West 
Germany and Japan). 
II. Termination of authoritarian regime and the move toward 
redemocratization could be initiated by the wielders of authoritarian power 
themselves. 
Path Four. Redemocratization Initiated from within the Authoritarian 
Regime. The perception of major institutional power-holders within the ruling 
authoritarian coalition that, because of changing conditions, their long-term 
interests are best pursued in a context in which authoritarian institutions give 
way to democratic institutions. This path has three subdivisions. 
Path Four(a). Redemocratization Initiated by the Civilian or 
Civilianized Political Leadership. Civilian leadership is more likely to persist 
2Higley and Günther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
3Dahl, Polyarchy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971. 
in its democratic initiative (and not encounter a military reaction) if the 
democratic opposition tacitly cooperates with the government in creating a 
peaceful framework for the transition. This path is very vulnerable to an 
internal coup (e.g., Spain). 
Path Four(b). Redemocratization Initiated by "Military-as- 
Government". The primary drive for a regime end comes from the individual 
leaders of the military government. The redemocratization effort may falter 
because of military resistance and no actual transfer of power may occur 
(e.g., Brazil). 
Path Four(c). Redemocratization Led by "Military-as-lnstitution." The 
primary motivator for the transition derives from corporate factors of the 
military-as-institution because the military-as-institution sees the leaders of 
the authoritarian government carrying out policies that create crises for the 
military-as-institution. Unless this path is augmented by other factors such 
as societal pressure, the military may retain several emergency powers (e.g., 
Greece and Portugal). 
III. Oppositional Forces play a key role in terminating and setting the 
framework for redemocratization. 
Path Five. Society-led Regime Termination. Transformation caused 
by diffuse protests, grass-roots organizations, massive but uncoordinated 
general strikes, and by general withdrawal of government support. This is a 
path toward government change rather than a path toward redemocratization 
(e.g., Greece). 
Path Six. Party Pact (With or Without Consociational Elements). The 
internal construction of a grand oppositional pact is possible with some 
consociational features. The pact members unite to defeat the authoritarian 
regime and lay the foundation for a successor democratic regime in which 
power is more open to most opposition forces (e.g., Chile and Uruguay). 
Path Seven. Organized Violent Revolt Coordinated by Democratic 
Reformist Parties. The revolt against authoritarianism has a party base, 
therefore, the parties can provide a continuous political direction unavailable 
to the diffuse society-led path (e.g., Costa Rica). 
Path Eight. Marxist-led Revolutionary War. This path has the 
theoretically predictable potential for fundamental socioeconomic changes 
because the revolutionary forces come to power only after defeating the state 
apparatus and a sector of the social order is displaced without waiting for the 
results of elections (e.g., Nicaragua). 
This thesis argues that in 1979, El Salvador followed primarily Path Four(b) and some 
aspect of Path Five to end the authoritarian regime and ignited the beginning of the 
Salvadoran redemocratization process. When Jose Napoleon Duarte4 was allowed to return 
from exile and invited to participate in the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno ( Revolutionary 
Government Junta) of 1981, El Salvador turned to Path Six as its new redemocratization 
path. 
John Higley and Richard Günther offered an elite-based approach to explaining 
democratization, one that helps illuminate the Salvadoran case. Analyzing the roles of elites 
in recent transitions to democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe, Higley and 
Günther concluded that the consolidation of a new democracy required the establishment 
of elite consensus and unity and extensive mass participation in elections and other 
institutional processes that make up a procedural democracy. They also argue that the key 
to the stability and survival of democratic regimes is the establishment of substantial 
consensus among elites regarding rules of the political "game" including the belief that 
politics is "bargaining", not "war". From this elite agreement comes a consolidated 
democracy by which democratic structures and norms are accepted by all civil society. 
Higley and Günther concluded that "achieving consolidated democracy depends principally 
on the choices and skills of elites."5 
In El Salvador, there has never been a consolidated democracy for two simple 
reasons. First, there has never been an establishment of substantial consensus among 
elites regarding rules of the political "game". Second, Salvadoran elites do not believe that 
government policies are handcrafted for the good of the nation but rather for the good of their 
own political parties or individual interests. El Salvador moved from a pseudo-democracy 
(1930-1979) to an unconsolidated democracy (1979-Present). Currently, there is no clear 
evidence that elites are willing to reach a consensus or to become unified. Salvadoran 
political actors and organizations do not possess the ability to agree on one national 
objective. 
Dahl's theory is based on the examination of several conditions under which 
democratized regimes or "polyarchies", as he calls them, exist and can be developed. He 
gives a list of these conditions and explains how they could influence the development of a 
polyarchy. These conditions are: the socioeconomic order; historical sequence; equalities 
4Jose Napoleon Duarte was one of the founders of the Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador. The military 
government forced him to leave the country in 1972. 
5Higley and Günther, 343. 
and inequalities; subcultural pluralism; level of socioeconomic development; foreign powers, 
and political activism. He stated that all conditions play an important role and, by examining 
these conditions, one can assess whether a country will establish or maintain a polyarchy.6 
In 1932, Dahl's analysis would undoubtedly have shown the existence of a closed hegemony 
m El Salvador. From 1982 to 1994, it would be extremely difficult to find all the necessary 
data to determine the actual status of some of Dahl's conditions. Despite this difficulty, I 
argue that El Salvador is trying to move toward a polyarchy. 
El Salvador case does not present an easy, clear-cut case for testing the adequacy 
of these three approaches, or for explaining which has the greatest explanatory power. El 
Salvador has not moved in at least three transitional paths (Stepan); the conditions do not 
exist in El Salvador to obtain a well-developed "polyarchy" (Dahl); and democratization in El 
Salvador depends on the choices and skills of elites (Higley and Günther). I argue that El 
Salvador's case does not follow one theoretical work because of is unique social, political, 
economic, and military factors. El Salvador's socioeconomic development relies almost 
exclusively on its agricultural economy which is based primarily on coffee production. El 
Salvador does not possess natural resources such as petroleum and natural gas, which 
makes the Salvadoran Gross National Product dependent on the world coffee market. With 
the smallest territory and the largest population in Central America, it is extremely difficult for 
those in power in El Salvador to meet social and economic demands. Moreover, as I will 
argue in the chapters to follow, El Salvador faced a set of political circumstances that 
created special impediments to democratization -- impediments that suggest some broader 
lessons for political development and conflict resolution in Latin America. 
6Dahl, 32. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (19TH CENTURY - 1984) 
To judge whether the 1991 peace accords are likely to create the basis for El 
Salvador's consolidation of democracy, one must examine the history of political, social, and 
economic changes in the country from 1870 to 1984. This chapter will examine Stepan's 
"Paths Toward ftedemocratization" theory to show how El Salvador moved from a military 
regime to an elected government in 1984. 
The Conquest turned El Salvador into a country in which Indians worked under 
various types of authoritarian labor regimes.7 The Indian population was forced to grow their 
crops on less-valuable hillsides, while Spaniards inhabited the well-watered land of the 
valleys. The rapid growth and the affluence of Europe and North America during the late 
nineteenth century created an increasing demand for coffee. Coffee grew very well on El 
Salvador's volcanic hillsides and the Indian-populated land suddenly became attractive to the 
Salvadoran oligarchy (the government). By 1900, the oligarchy, through various legal 
devices and with organized force, pressured the Indians to leave the hillsides. Under the 
control of the oligarchy, the National Guard, created in 1912 as a force distinct from the 
National Army, cleared the Indians from the hillsides. The campesinos (lower class), 
comprising six percent of the population, demanded land and resented land monopolization 
by the "seven families."8 The high density of population combined with the lack of valuable 
land increased the frustration of the Salvadoran people. 
Despite the socioeconomic unrest of the country in the 1910s, El Salvador became 
a nation with a booming economy centered on the monocrop production and exportation of 
coffee. By 1915, the oligarchy controlled the productive lands, the political apparatus, and 
the armed forces. National imports were geared toward the needs of the oligarchy rather 
than toward the development of the nation as a whole.9 Through the use of the armed 
forces, the oligarchy managed to maintain its status quo, and the armed forces owed their 
'Needier, Martin C. El Salvador: The Military and Politics, University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 1991, p.571. 
The "seven families" was the upper class of the country. It was a group of individuals who controlled the 
economic, and political structure of El Salvador from the commercial revolution of 1870 to the collapse of the 
oligarchy republic in 1979. 
9Richard Haggerty, "Historical Setting," El Salvador: A Country Study, ed. Louis Mortimer (Washington D.C., 
U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1990), 32. 
loyalty to them. The government was merely a reflection of the priorities and wishes of the 
oligarchy. 
The desperate economic situation, worsened by falling coffee prices during the 
worldwide depression of the 1930s, increased the socio-political unrest under the leadership 
of Augusto Farabundo Marti.10 With a nonexistent middle class and a large lower class, 
Marti, in 1932, organized an armed insurrection to overthrow the government. The main goal 
of the insurrection was to install a Communist regime in the country.11 In order to defuse 
Marti's rebellion, President Araujo (the elected civilian president) announced local elections. 
The elections were opened to opposition parties such as Marti's Socorro Rojo Internacional 
(SRI -Red Aid International) and the Partido Comunista de El Salvador (PCES - Communist 
Party of El Salvador).12 President Araujo's decision threatened the oligarchy's political 
control. Responding to oligarchy's demands, the armed forces organized a coup to 
overthrow President Araujo under the leadership of General Maximiliane- Martinez.13 
President Araujo did not oppose the coup for various reasons. First, the economic 
crisis of the 1930s and Marti's popular support portrayed a threat to the oligarchy and their 
goods. Second, the military, traditionally allied with the government and the economic elites, 
was the most reliable and organized institution to take controi of the country's socioeconomic 
crisis. Finally, with a military government, the oligarchy had the opportunity to influence the 
Salvadoran economy and government. 
In December 1931, General Martinez allowed national elections to take place. Leftist 
candidates won heavily throughout the rural areas. The elections did not change the political 
structure of the country, they were simply a tactic to get Marti's supporters into the open. 
Before they could take office, the La Matanza (The Killing) began.14 Approximately 20,000 
Salvadorans died in this incident. Alastair White stated that "military reprisals showed to the 
rural population that the military was now in control, and that it would brook no challenge to 
!0Farabundo Marti organized the first Salvadoran communist group in 1921 after the Bolshevik Revolution. In 
1932, he transformed this group into the Communist Party of El Salvador. 
"Richard Haggerty, 15. 
12MartinC. Needier, "El Salvador The Military and Politics," University of the Pacific Press: Stockton, 1989, 571. 
"General Maximiliano Martinez began the era of military dictators in El Salvador that would last for 55 years. 
'"Richard Haggerty, 17. 
its rule or to its prevailing system."15 The Killing served as an object lesson to the Left and 
other opposition parties when it came to trusting the government, the military, and the 
electoral process. 
Socioeconomic stability characterized the 1940s and 1950s. The military regimes 
developed an infrastructure that allowed and promoted economic growth and, by the end of 
1950s, El Salvador became the most influential nation of the Mercado Comun 
Centroamericano (Central American Common Market).16 Despite the economic growth, 
military repression continued in the countryside. Labor and student political activities were 
banned, along with rights of free expression and assembly. The military regime continued 
to govern the country with the support and influence of the oligarchy. During the 1960s, the 
Cuban Revolution gave impetus to Salvadoran instability and worried economic elites and 
the military alike. From 1932 to 1960, military governments changed either by fraudulent 
elections or by a "coup d'etat' organized by economic elites. Governments were replaced 
by the oligarchy when they promoted reforms to improve the living standards of the lower and 
middle classes. 
In 1962, national elections took place for the first time since 1932. Only the 
government party, Partido Revolucionario de Unification Democratica (PRUD - Democratic 
Unification Revolutionary Party), had any organization, thereby winning the presidential 
elections. The first viable opposition party, Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC - Christian 
Democrat Party), rose from the electorate. The PDC attracted its support with a centrist 
platform. Jose Napoleon Duarte, a popular political figure and a founder of the PDC, became 
the leader.17 Duarte's popularity, visibility, and support of the middle and lower classes 
allowed him to win the election for mayor of San Salvador. 
An economic downturn in the 1960s increased the social unrest culminating in the 
1969 "Soccer War" with Honduras. The war dramatically worsened the country's 
socioeconomic problems when thousands of poor and landless Salvadoran peasants were 
forcibly returned from the border. The war also increased the problem of overpopulation, 
land shortages, and unemployment. These and other factors sped the onset of the civil war 
of the 1980s. In 1970, social unrest met with stepped-up death-squad activities reinforcing 
15Alastair White, El Salvador (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 127. 
16Richard Haggerty, 128. 
"Richard Haggerty, 21. 
peasants' efforts (with the implicit blessings of the Catholic Church) to organize for self- 
protection by the procurement of war weapons and the training in guerrilla tactics. Intensified 
rural demonstrations sprang up and the military government was not in the position, nor 
inclined, to alleviate the sources of the social unrest. 
Opposition parties and the Left took advantage and increased mass demonstrations, 
primarily through labor union groups. Opposition parties pressed the government for social, 
economic, and political reforms and demanded the disappearance of the authoritarian regime 
and the start of a land distribution plan. The government lacked the funds needed to buy the 
land to be distributed because neither the oligarchy nor the international community approved 
this agrarian plan.18 After this unsuccessful event, the renamed government party, Partido 
de Conciliacion Nacional (PCN - National Conciliation Party), lost even more rural support 
and the PDC filled the void with an agrarian reform platform for the upcoming presidential 
elections. 
By 1970, most of the political party or union leaders had gone into exile or hiding due 
to increasingly repressive military leaders. Popular organizations representing workers, 
peasants, students or others whose rights needed protection, organized heavily armed 
clandestine groups to fight the government.19 In 1972, presidential elections took place to 
remedy the socio-political crisis. The PDC and other opposition parties united to bring down 
the military regime.20 
The elections, as in 1932, destroyed any image of popular democracy, and the 
legitimacy of the government declined even more. When Duarte, the presidential candidate 
of the PDC, pulled ahead in the vote, the military closed the tabulating, awarding victory to 
the PCN candidate. This action demonstrated to opposition leaders that political change 
could not be reached through the popular vote. With the support of opposition leaders, the 
Left took advantage of this situation and pressed for revolutionary activities. Other opposition 
leaders supported the Left's ideals, and they joined the communist struggle. 
iaJorge Larde y Larin, Oriqenes de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador, San Salvador: Estado Mayor, 1977, 34. 
19These five clandestine groups united in 1980 to form what is now know as the Frente Farabundo Marti para 
la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN). 
20The most predominant opposition leaders, that joined this political movement, came from the Salvadoran 
Communist Party. These same elites formed the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR - Revolutionary 
Democratic Front) and united with the FMLN in 1980. They represented the political side of the FMLN throughout 
the negotiation process of the 1980s. 
10 
The election fraud also sparked a coup, organized by young Army officers, to install 
Duarte as the elected President. The coup failed because neither Duarte nor the "reformist" 
officers enjoyed the support of the oligarchy and the high command of the military. Loyal 
government units quickly moved in and destroyed the coup. Duarte's popularity won him the 
election, but the lack of oligarchic and military support prevented him from taking office. On 
the same day that the coup was thwarted, Duarte was accused of being a supporter of 
Castro's communist ideals and he was forced into exile in Venezuela. 
In 1976, Joaquin Villalobos21 stated: 
Tensions rose to unmanageable levels as new actors demanded genuinely 
free elections, and the right to free expression and political participation. 
When military personnel responded to these demands with violent 
repression, the country was set on the path to the civil war.22 
The government continued to use violent force against its citizens to stay in power. 
According to Villalobos, "the people in 1975, as a logical justification to insurrection, decided 
that if the state can use violence to maintain itself in power then the people have the right 
to use the same measures to express their political beliefs."23 The socio-political crisis, the 
unstable economy, the clandestine armed groups supported by the Catholic Church, and the 
lack of government legitimacy during the 1970s ignited the civil war. There was nothing that 
the military government could have done to stop the development of the left-wing insurgency. 
In 1977, left-wing insurgencies intensified their efforts to unbalance the government 
through a range of mass demonstrations in San Salvador. The military, backed by the 
oligarchy, tried to stop the country crisis with repressive actions, but the socioeconomic 
unrest increased even more. In an attempt to alleviate the situation, presidential elections 
were announced for 1977. It was too late; the country was set on the path to civil war. 
21Joaquin Villalobos is the leader of the Expresion Renovadora del Pueblo (ERP - Peoples' Reformist 
Expression), which is one of the five factions of the FMLN. 
"Enrique A. Baloyra, "Salvaging El Salvador," Journal of Democracy 3, 2 (April 1992), 79. 
"Joaquin Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution for El Salvador," Foreign Policy 74 (Spring '89): 120. 
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A. CIVIL WAR ESCALATION PERIOD (1979 - 1984) 
With the successful development of the left-wing insurgency in the 1970s, the 
national situation worsened day by day. The insurgency gained full control of the masses 
and their organizations. Mass demonstrations in San Salvador increased and the 
government was unable to stop them. Leftist-oriented groups centered on the Bloque 
Popular Revolucionario (BPR - Popular Revolutionary Bloc), and the church-sponsored 
Comunidades Eclesiasticas de Base (CEB - Christian Base Communities). These groups 
actively promoted mass discontent and violence. Villalobos said that "the rise of the 
Salvadoran revolutionary movement coincides historically with the Roman Catholic Church's 
turn toward a greater commitment to social justice."24 This social justice doctrine was known 
as the Teologia para la Liberation (Liberation Theology). Anti-government violence also 
grew byway of the armed Left with the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP - People's 
Revolutionary Army) and the Fuerzas Populäres de Liberation (FPL - Popular Liberation 
Forces). These two organizations became the most active and violent insurgent groups of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Anti-government activities gave rise to the right-wing death squads 
whose primary targets were the identifiable religious and CEB leaders. A vicious cycle of 
violence from both sides plagued the nation. 
The presidential elections of 1977 attempted to alleviate the national crisis but 
another electoral sham took place. General Humberto Romero, the PCN presidential 
candidate, came to power and violence erupted in San Salvador in protest against the 
fraudulent vote. Approximately 20 to 30 Salvadorans died in theses activities. These killings 
further polarized Salvadoran political elites and provided a propaganda advantage to the Left. 
Martin E. Anderson writes that "the process of extreme polarization alarmed those political 
actors who saw the old regime of oligarchy and military domination as no longer workable 
but who feared the consequences of a successful Communist led revolt."25 
In August 1979, the Foro Popular (Popular Forum), formed by young military officers, 
centrist politicians and progressive members of the business community, formulated a plan 
to remove General Romero. In October 1979, a coup removed Romero's government and 
established a reformist civil-military junta. The junta was formed by one businessman, one 
24Joaquin Villalobos: 120. 
25
 Andersen, "The Military Obstacle To Latin American Democracy," Foreign Policy, 73 (Winter 1989): 109. 
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representative of the Catholic University, one Social Democratic leader, and two well-known 
and respected military officers.26 
Despite the efforts of the junta to promote reforms, the Left continued to exert its 
influence over the masses and created an environment of uncertainty against the junta. The 
1979 Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua gave the Left further impetus in their armed struggle 
and increased their commitment to impose a communist regime in the country. Although the 
military broke its alliance with the oligarchy after the coup, it continued to influence and 
counter the junta's reforms. The junta delivered an ultimatum to the military, demanding that 
the armed forces recognize civilian control. This ultimatum was rejected and, as a result, the 
junta resigned in the first week of 1980. 
The same week, another junta took power. The leadership of the new junta came 
from the Christian Democratic party.27 Duarte's return from exile caused further distrust by 
far right-wing elements in the military. Duarte's involvement in this junta was viewed "as an 
opportunity to establish a political center in El Salvador, and to make a transition to a 
genuinely democratic system."28 At the end of 1980, a coup was planned against the junta 
by a right-wing officer by the name of Roberto D'Aubuisson , who tried to incite political 
unrest among a group of young officers. He became the founder of the right-wing party 
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA - Republican Nationalist Alliance) in 1983. The 
coup was forestalled by the vigorous intervention of the United States. 
By February 1980, the threat of the Left increased and several prominent PDC 
leaders who argued against military intervention in the junta were killed and the junta broke 
apart in protest. The junta was replaced by a third. Duarte became the leader of this group 
and wrestled with the conflicting problems facing the regime. In March 1980, the 
assassination of politically-active Archbishop Amulfo Romero and the killing of demonstrators 
at his funeral by security forces, increased the social-political unrest of the country. 
International press coverage of these events further polarized what remained of the political 
center and prompted the United States to cut what little military aid the country was 
receiving. This U.S. attitude encouraged the campaign of the Left, which drew parallels with 
^hese three officers represented the conservative and moderate sides of the armed forces, even though two 
of them joined the FMLN in 1980. 
27Jose Napoleon Duarte returned from exile with the help of the United States and other opposition parties. 
28Enrique Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition. University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill, NC, 1982, p. 98. 
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Nicaragua. The Salvadoran government and the armed forces sought to counter the 
Nicaraguan example, and in December 1980 conservative elements in the military supported 
a new junta. The new mission of the military became to counterattack by all means available 
the uprising of the leftist insurgency. 
During these reformist juntas of 1979-1980, mass demonstrations continued and the 
social unrest escalated as the government tried to carry out new reforms. The Left's military 
apparatus grew steadily through Cuban/Soviet arms shipments via Nicaragua. By 1979, 
leftist groups were divided and continued to operate under their own agendas. However, in 
1980, the Left united in order to continue to receive support from its communist allies. The 
process of unifying the Left began in May 1980 with the direct involvement and assistance 
of Fidel Castro who united the factions under the banner of the Direction Revolucionaria 
Unificada (DRU - Unified Revolutionary Directorate), the Coordinadora Revolucionaria 
(Revolutionary Coordinator) and the Frente Democratico Revolucionario (FDR - Democratic 
Revolutionary Front).29 
By the end of 1980, the FMLN had moved to the countryside and developed a new 
strategy to shatter the nation's agriculture-based economy by burning coffee, cotton, and 
sugarcane plantations. The FMLN pressed to take over the government by force and 
promoted violent mass demonstrations to support its military actions. The military tried, with 
its few available resources, to counterattack the FMLN-FDR. In January 1981, the FMLN, 
with the support of its communist allies, organized the Ofensiva Final (Final Offensive) which 
proved to be both positive and negative for the insurgents. Negative, because they did not 
receive the massive rural support which they needed to succeed. Positive, because the 
insurgents showed their military strength and their ability to control territory. However, the 
Armed Forces, with scarce resources, counterattacked and managed to control the situation. 
After the offensive, the French and Mexican governments recognized the FMLN as a 
"representative" political force, which gave strength to the FMLN because its socio-political 
goals had international support. 
The timing of the FMLN offensive was not coincidental. Their intentions were to take 
over the government before Ronald Reagan took office in the United States. The Carter 
administration hoped to influence the situation with his human rights policy and end the 
spread and escalation of violence.  Human rights violations committed by the government 
!9Alan Riding, "The Central American Quagmire," Foreign Affairs, 61, 3: 644. 
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in the 1970s led the Carter administration to reduce economic aid.30 Aggressive actions of 
the Left in 1979, along with Carter's fear of "losing" El Salvador (as he had "lost" Nicaragua), 
led the Carter administration to renew its military aid to the Salvadoran government. Carter 
lost the election and Ronald Reagan moved into the White House in January 1980. 
Reagan's priority was to counter the perceived domino effect in Central America. 
Therefore, he gave expanded military aid to El Salvador under the Reagan Doctrine which 
called for total support to any nation fighting against communist expansion. El Salvador 
received massive economic assistance geared to restore the losses caused by the sabotage 
from the guerrillas and legitimize the government through the electoral process. As with 
Carter, Reagan knew the PDC would be the most appropriate party by which to build political 
consensus for the Salvadoran democratic process. The United States believed that the 
Christian Democrats could influence the supporters of both the Left and the Right. 
By 1981, Salvadoran elites and the armed forces recognized that U.S. support was 
necessary to survive the civil war. On the other hand, the Left, with the help of the 
communist community through Nicaragua, strengthened their position. The FMLN developed 
a new strategy, Guerra Popular Prolongada (Prolonged Popular War), which sought to 
prolong the war, thereby forcing the U.S. Congress to compel Reagan to pull out. In 
December 1981, congressional elections were scheduled for March 1982. The 1982 
election brought new political actors and sparked the beginning of a transition to democracy. 
Six parties participated in the election, but only three received significant popular support: 
the PCN government party, Duarte's PDC, and the newly organized ARENA. 
Despite the effort of the government to promote political participation, the Left refused 
to participate, citing security concerns. Instead, the Left tried unsuccessfully to sabotage the 
elections. After the legislative elections of 1982, an apolitical president came to power 
named Alvaro Magana. The Salvadoran people realized that El Salvador's reconciliation 
would come in the polls and not on the battlefield. Despite the nationalistic demonstration, 
the Left believed that the elections were a "tool of the Right" to impose control in the country 
and maintained their belief that an armed struggle was the best way to obtain their 
objectives. 
30Harold Molineu, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1990), 219. 
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The electoral result took Washington by surprise because, while the United States 
supported the PDC, the PCN and ARENA won a plurality of votes31 and garnered a majority 
in the Constituent Assembly. With 68% of the population voting, the final count showed 
ARENA and the PCN with a combined 36 representative and the PDC with 24.32 The United 
States feared that ARENA and the PCN would control the Assembly and draft a new 
constitution in support of Rightist ideals. This never occurred. Instead, political elites tried 
to work together, at least in theory, to pull the country out of the crisis. 
Fighting did not diminish after the 1982 elections, even though the FfvlLN, while not 
participating in the elections, called for negotiations. They demanded a "power sharing" 
position in the government and the armed forces. Despite the desire of the FMLN-FDR to 
negotiate, the fighting intensified. Cuba responded by sending more sophisticated weapons 
-- Soviet Rocket Launchers, and high power antiaircraft rifles (Dragonoff). In response, 
Reagan increased military aid from $50.0 million in 1983 to $62.0 million in 1984.33 The 
Salvadoran government refused to negotiate and the military hoped to make tactical progress 
against the FMLN on the battlefield. The United States did not press for a negotiated 
settlement in the early 1980s; instead, it continued to promote the legitimacy of the 
Salvadoran government and to strengthen its democratic ideals. 
With the rising military and economic support to both sides, the civi! war slipped into 
a stalemate. While the Left was committed to civi! war, the United States pushed the 
Salvadoran government to legitimate its power through elections. In 1983, to undermine the 
FMLN-FDR, the Salvadoran government announced presidential elections for 1984. 
Presidential election and the transition to a civilian president were the price El Salvador had 
to pay for U.S. assistance. Jose Napoleon Duarte, actively supported by U.S. financing, won 
the 1984 election in a runoff against the ARENA candidate. 
B. ANALYSIS 
El Salvador was not a case of ^democratization in 1979 because it lacked a 
democratic history. Behind the democratic facade of 1912 to 1979, El Salvador was an 
oligarchy-military authoritarianism republic in which political competition took place only 
3,ARENA gathered the majority of the votes from the middle and lower classes. 
32
 Richard Haggerty, 246. 
"Richard Haggerty, 249. 
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among economic elites, the lower class was too big and too dependent upon coffee 
revenues to promote reforms, and the armed forces repressed any disaffection on the part 
of the Salvadoran people. The oligarchy republic needed the presence of the military as 
government and as institution to survive. 
From 1932 to 1979, there was little room, if any, for political expression. The 
expansion of the middle class in the 1970s and their frustration over the lack of free elections 
forced the military officers to mediate between the demands of the oligarchy and the middle 
class. These events, combined with a weak economy, set the stage for the cycle of violence 
of the 1970s and the civil war. Social discontent prompted the need for political expression, 
which threatened the position of the military and the oligarchy. The military tried to 
undermine this need through repressive actions. 
In 1972, El Salvador attempted Stepan's Path Six (Party Pact), when Duarte and 
other opposition parties united to end the military regime in the presidential elections of 1972. 
The power and imposition of the military regime overshadowed their efforts. Many political 
analysts believe that if Duarte had taken office after the elections of 1972, El Salvador's civil 
war would have never erupted. Joaquin Villalobos' 1991 statement contradicted this 
analysis. He said that "even if radical changes had taken place in El Salvador before 1979, 
the Salvadoran left-wing commanders and the International Communist Community believed 
that a Marxist-Leninist revolution was the only viable solution to the Salvadoran crisis."34 
In 1979, El Salvador again tried to find a path to democracy. The nation followed two 
of Stepan's paths. The first was Stepan's Path 5 (Society-led Regime Termination). El 
Salvador's society under the leadership of the FMLN-FDR and other opposition parties 
diffused massive violent demonstrations. To counterattack this action, the "military-as- 
government" reacted with repressive action with the use of the military-as-institution. This 
situation brought Stepan's Path Four(c) (Redemocratization led by "Military-as-lnstitution") 
into play. Young Army officers organized the coup of 1979 to overthrow the military-as- 
govemment because they believed that the military regime carried out policies that harmed 
the military-as-institution. The military system collapsed in 1979 because of persistent 
electoral fraud, stagnant economic growth, and the increased viability of those groups, driven 
by repression, who opted for revolutionary strategies. With civilian participation in the 1979 
34Speech given by Joaquin Villalobos at a Round-Table Conference "Peace and Reconciliation in El 
Salvador,"sponsored by U.S. Army War College and The Democracy Projects, School of International Service of 
the American University, 8-9 September 1994. 
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junta, the country returned to Stepan's Path Six (Party Pact). Opposition parties with the 
military institution united to lay the foundation for a more democratic regime. 
The Salvadoran civil war was generated by socio-political factors. The FMLN-FDR 
justified their actions by saying that civil war was the solution to these problems. The social 
objectives of the civil war were to favor the unprotected lower and the new middle classes 
and to fight against the monopolization of power by the oligarchy. The political objectives 
were to liberate the electoral process and political competition and to carry out the right of 
the people to choose their own government.35 During the 1970s, social objectives prevailed 
over political ones. 
The armed insurrection of 1932 and the civil war of 1979 developed with the purpose 
of promoting socio-political changes. However, Salvadorans believed that eventually the 
solutions to these problems were to be found, not in the blood of the people, but over a 
negotiating table. 
35The diversity of political ideals came from the diversity of thinking among the factions of the FMLN. Some of 
the factions reflected well-marked Marxist-Leninist ideals, while others faction represented more social-democratic 
ideologies. 
111. THE PEACE PROCESS (1981 -16 JANUARY 1992) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes how different international and national variables affected the 
outcome of President Duarte (1981-1988) and President Cristiani (1989-1992) negotiation 
period. Examination of Günther and Higley's theory on Elite Transformation and Democratic 
Regimes will also be used to explain the elite settlement of December 1991. 
In the early 1980s, it was unimaginable that El Salvador's armed conflict would end 
with a consensus in favor of nonviolence, a political settlement, democratic norms, and 
respect for human rights. It was also unimaginable that both parties could overcome the 
obstacles that had permanently separated them and agree to a genuine peace settlement. 
If one is to analyze how the peace accords of 1992 were signed, one must look at them in 
light of their stunning improbability. 
In 1984, President Jose Napoleon Duarte began a formal negotiation process with 
the FMLN-FDR to bring all Salvadorans together to find a peaceful solution to the armed 
conflict. Over a period of four years, President Duarte tried unsuccessfully to consolidate the 
peace talks. 
When Alfredo Cristiani, the candidate of the right-wing ARENA party, was elected 
president in March 1989, many observers feared that hope for El Salvador's peace and 
democracy had to be postponed, if not abandoned. In his inaugural speech, President 
Cristiani belied those fears and indicated that he, personally, wanted a political settlement 
with the FMLN. A series of wide-ranging negotiations between Cristiani's government and 
the FMLN began in early 1989 and culminated with the peace accord signed in Mexico City 
on 16 January 1992. These accords eliminated most of the controversial Salvadoran political 
problems and established a stable democratic system in accord with the rules of law. 
B. ANALYSIS 
Günther and Higley argue that conflict resolution can be reached by ". . . the 
establishment of an elite consensus and unity, as well as extensive mass participation in the 
elections, and other institutional processes that constitutes a procedural democracy."36 What 
differentiates each negotiating process are the disparate internal and/or external variables 
6Gunther and Higley, 9. 
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that influence the outcome of the process (the negotiation parties, political society, civil 
society, the military, international organizations and/or actors, etc.). 
In El Salvador, two negotiation periods took place: President Duarte's Negotiations 
(1981-1988), and President Cristiani's Negotiations (1989-1992). These periods had some 
critical differences in terms of political circumstances and the negotiating strategies of the 
parties to the Salvadoran conflict. 
1. President Duarte's Negotiations (1981-1988) 
Many historians and political analysts do not recognize that the Peace Process in El 
Salvador began during Duarte's junta (1981). The negotiating process began after the 
FMLN's unsuccessful armed insurrection of 1981 because it prompted the insurgents to 
formulate a political strategy to reach their socio-political objectives. After the FMLN's 
offensive, the social and political life of El Salvador changed profoundly. The war erupted, 
and Salvadoran and international elites began to seek alternatives to end the civil war. 
Because of this, the FMLN's General Command and its allies from the FDR developed a new 
strategy called Solution Politica (Political Solution). 
The FMLN-FDR demanded an honest dialogue with the government, a conditional 
cease fire, and the surrender of weapons by both sides. The FMLN-FDR also demanded the 
involvement of all factions of the FMLN-FDR's alliance in the negotiation process, the 
presence of International observers, and a complete discussion regarding all aspects of the 
Salvadoran situation. The issues to be discussed were: (1) the establishment of a new 
political, economic, and judicial order that would permit the participation of all Salvadoran 
society; and (2) a new structure of the armed forces. 
The Mexican and French governments and the Social-Democrata international 
(Social-Democrat Internationa!) supported the FMLN-FDR's political solution. The issues of 
the peace talks were included in the FMLN-FDR's agenda presented to the United Nations 
in October 1981 through the Coordinador Genera! de la Junta de Nicaragua (General 
Coordinator of the Nicaraguan Junta), Daniel Ortega. This agenda disqualified the legitimacy 
of any popular election while the nation was involved in an internal war.37 The FMLN argued 
that the country did not possess the minimum conditions to protect either human rights or 
the free political expression of the Salvadorans. In 1981, Duarte also developed a 
negotiation alternative, Electiones Libras y Solution Militär (Free Elections and Military 
7The FMLN was referring to the upcoming congressional elections of 1982. 
20 
Solution). This alternative, supported by U.S. government, had two intentions: to promote 
internal and international consensus toward the Salvadoran government, and to obtain 
legitimacy for those military operations destined to stop the FMLN-FDR's revolution. During 
1981 to 1984, neither the Left nor the government complied with their negotiation proposals 
to end the armed conflict. 
Duarte's election in 1984 spawned a new era of peace negotiations. With the support 
of the military and the involvement of all segments of society, President Duarte invited the 
FMLN-FDR to the negotiating table to discuss the end of the Salvadoran armed conflict. Of 
all Duarte's meetings, the most important was the meeting in La Palma in 1984 because, for 
the first time, the government and the FMLN-FDR came together to debate over a 
negotiating table. The rest of Duarte's meetings were merely a continuation of the one in La 
Palma. 
What caused the failure of Duarte's negotiating efforts? The answer to this question 
is found in an examination of the national and international variables that influenced the 
outcome of the negotiation process. 
2. National Variables 
The government kept an open, flexible, and enthusiastic attitude throughout the 
negotiations to promote successful peace talks between both parties. Despite the 
unsuccessful outcome, Duarte had many political triumphs, such as the accords to 
"humanize" the conflict,38 the exchange of prisoners, and the declaration of amnesty during 
the civil war.39 But, the government fell short in their efforts to create a trusting environment 
and a dynamic peace process in which both sides felt comfortable with the other's 
negotiating positions. This distrust was promoted by the presence of U.S. military advisers 
in the country, the influence of national and international actors in the government's decision- 
making process, and the divided position of the FMLN. Duarte's final achievement was the 
signing of the Esquipulas II Accords in 1987, that later changed the context of the negotiation 
process.40 
The position of the FMLN-FDR's negotiating commission was divided, 
unprofessional, and very negative throughout the peace talks. The FMLN wanted a military 
aSee Appendix A., the meeting of Ayagualo, 1984. 
9See Appendix A., meeting of Caracas, 1987. 
°See Appendix A., 7. 
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solution and the FDR wanted a diplomatic-political solution. These two tendencies prevailed 
every time they came to the negotiating table and, without a doubt, the FMLN and the FDR 
promoted each other's position. This attitude was seen for the first time after the 
unsuccessful meeting of Sesori in 1986.41 
With the threat of the Marxist-Leninist insurgents, the military institution took a 
different role during Duarte's administration. When the communist movement grew stronger 
daily, the armed forces focused on defending the sovereignty of the nation. The presence 
of the military in the negotiating meetings did not interfere with the outcome of each meeting 
because they were acting only as military advisers to the president. 
In 1986, high ranking officers42 decided to analyze the crisis. Their analysis examined 
those factors that had led to the civil war. Their conclusion was that the national crisis had 
developed through a breakdown of social norms, which created a profound social disorder. 
This social disorder created a fragile socio-political and economic system -- poverty, social 
injustice, electoral fraud, repression, etc. All these elements promoted violence, social 
disintegration and, as a result, civil war. With this in mind, the military advised the president 
that a democratic system was the solution to the nation's crisis and recommended reforms 
to the political, social, economic, and military structures. The armed forces stated that the 
solution to the armed conflict would not come through a military solution, but through a 
negotiated solution. 
Salvadoran civil society has traditionally supported those political parties or 
institutions that promoted profound social and political change. The FMLN took advantage 
of this and used part of the Salvadoran society to promote idealistic movements and 
demonstrations, moving the people through the Ejercito Politico de Masas (Army of Political 
Masses) to create a unstable socio-political environment. The FMLN used the masses every 
time they felt threatened by the negotiating process.43 When President Duarte invited the 
FMLN to negotiate, most of the civil society approved this decision for one reason -- they 
wanted the civil war to end. 
The government allowed the Church to participate in the negotiation process. They 
played the role of mediator in the negotiations and formulated and developed schedules, 
41See Appendix A. for more detail (Sesori, 1986). 
"General Adolfo O. Blandon, former Chairman of the Joint Chief Staff (1984-1988), and his staff. 
43See Appendix A., 6. 
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agendas and conditions for each party before they came to the negotiating table, and offered 
proposals to overcome the negotiation barriers and to facilitate improvements in the peace 
talks. 
3. International Factors 
El Salvador was caught in the snowball effect created by the West-East 
confrontation. The Cold War, which had fueled the continuity of the civil war, came to a dead 
end. The endless support of the Communist Community and the European Union for the 
FMLN and the millions of dollars in support from the United States created a stalemate. 
These factors will be furthered discussed in this chapter. 
4. Reasons for Failure 
The only element that truly wanted an end to the armed conflict was the Salvadoran 
people. Salvadoran lives had paid the cost of the civil war and, by the end of Duarte's term, 
more than 40,000 people had died as a result of the civil war. 
However, the solution to the armed conflict during Duarte's administration was not 
found because the negotiating commission of the Left was a vicious circle of internal 
disputes between the FMLN and the FDR, making their position unclear and uncertain over 
the negotiating table. The armed conflict became part of the West-East confrontation, 
causing the war to come to a stalemate. Neither the government, with the United States, nor 
the FMLN, with the Communist Community, wanted to give up their commitment to the 
military solution. The FMLN-FDR was not cooperative; instead, they tried to compete against 
the government. They did not admit their internal conflict, failed to agree on joint solutions, 
and failed to view the armed conflict as a joint problem. Most of the political society stayed 
out of the picture, leaving the government party, the PDC, alone in the political struggle. 
Neither elite consensus nor unity occurred during this period. 
5. President Cristiani's Negotiation Period (1989-1992) 
When Cristiani came to Office in 1989, many political events were taking place 
around the world that created a successful negotiating environment. Some of these events 
were the fall of the Berlin Wall; Gorbachev's controversial Perestroika; the election of 
President George Bush; and the beginning of the end of the Cold War. During the first year 
of the ARENA Government, the negotiation process experienced major changes. In his 
inaugural speech, President Cristiani promised the Salvadoran people that his government 
would stop the unjust and bloody war.  He also offered to immediately resume the peace 
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talks with an adequate negotiation method and within a constitutional framework, as 
previously outlined by Duarte. Cristiani proposed five negotiation points:44 
1. To analyze feasible mechanisms to impel a permanent, and serious debate 
between the democratic sector and the FMLN-FDR. 
2. To create a government dialogue commission with democratic personalities. 
This commission would contact those persons designated by FMLN to formulate 
a work plan. Also, they would discuss the necessary aspects to achieve the 
incorporation of all social sectors to the democratic process, and the 
mechanisms for a better representative democracy. 
3. Once the debate started, it could not cease unilaterally by any motive; until a 
concrete solution to the conflict was presented to any organization of higher 
political decision (i.e., the United Nation or the OAS). 
4. The Government, in all the stages of the negotiation process, would be in 
constant conference with national socio-political forces. 
5. To propose that the peace talks take place outside El Salvador, especially in 
other Central American nation. 
Cristiani's dialogue was similar to that of former President Duarte. The difference 
was that Cristiani's negotiation procedures made the peace talks more dynamic and flexible 
to agreement. Additionally, this framework allowed for popular acceptance of a political 
solution and participation by both parties. As a result, the peace talks resumed in 1989. 
If the procedures and proposals were almost identical to those used by Duarte, why 
was Duarte unsuccessful and Cristiani successful? The answer to this question also lies in 
the national and international variables that influenced the outcome of Cristiani's peace 
process. 
6. National Variables 
National and international organizations feared that Cristiani's government would 
reject a political solution to the conflict and push for a military victory. Cristiani's 1989 
inauguration speech confirmed his desire to negotiate with the FMLN. Cristiani convinced 
the far-right, the FMLN moderates, and the United States that he was sincere, honest, and 
capable of imposing his political decisions. His attitude motivated the FMLN to come to the 
negotiating table, but they still had doubts about his right-wing political tendencies. 
4La Prensa Grafica Newspaper, San Salvador: El Salvador, 16 June 1989, 1. 
24 
Cristiani recognized that El Salvador's economic hopes for recovery were tied to U.S. 
Congressional support. Therefore, he and his government continued to push for a political 
solution. Cristiani knew that a political settlement was the only way to continue to receive 
economic aid from the United States even when political and military events challenged the 
peace talks (the offensives of 1989 and 1990).45 
Important changes also occurred in the FMLN-FDR. In 1988, the leadership of the 
FMLN began to seriously evaluate its military-political goals and strategies. The events that 
triggered this self-analysis were the chaotic insurgent offensive of 1989 and the negative 
outcome obtained by FMLN's delegates, who visited different countries to reinforce support 
for their cause (Mexico, France, Nicaragua, and Cuba). The message to the FMLN was that 
a military victory was far from imminent and that the FMLN should adopt and stay supportive 
of a political settlement. Internally, the FMLN realized that their military power and political 
influence was declining. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the economic changes under Mikhail Gorbachev, and the 
crumbling of the Marxist-Leninist political system also sparked two changes in the FMLN. 
First, Joaquin Villalobos said that "the rebels were not dogmatic socialists but were 
demanding resolutions to the country's problems within a Western style democracy."46 This 
statement gave way to a drastic shift in the ideological perspective and direction of the FMLN 
General Command. Second, Soviet international policies shifted extremely when the Soviet 
government said that it would not continue to support any revolutionary movements. This 
gave even more reasons for the FMLN to question their capability to continue their military 
operations. Villalobos' modified position showed an idealistic division within the FMLN's 
General Command. Two examples of this division were that: (1) the FMLN openly defied 
Villalobos' attitude and continued its military operations; and (2) the negotiation process was 
seen by some FMLN commanders as a political instrument to prolong the war, and for others 
as a way to obtain full power of the government. 
Military actions, such as the offensives of 1989 and 1990, showed the government 
that the FMLN-FDR was negotiating from a position of strength. Clearly, the FMLN continued 
to use military action every time their interests were threatened by the peace process (i.e., 
the offensive of 1989). When the armed forces made efforts to stop the escalation of the 
45See Appendix A., the Dialogue Efforts after the Offensive, page 34, and the Offensive of November 1990, 45. 
46Joaquin Villalobos, 45. 
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civil war, the FMLN took a harder and less flexible position over the negotiating table. They 
retaliated by pressing the issue of the purge and reduction of the armed forces.47 This 
caused uncertainty and confrontation between the two negotiating commissions and created 
a stalemate in the peace talks. 
Changes also took place in the military. There was a philosophical split within the 
military between moderates who showed flexibility toward the peace talks and others who 
looked at the negotiations as a sign of weakness. This split became evident after the signing 
of San Jose I, II, and III in July-September 1990.48 Despite this division, the armed forces 
recognized that a conflict resolution must have a social basis and that a military victory was 
far from materializing. Consequently, the military institution established its final strategy of 
the war- to reach a peaceful solution to the armed conflict and support the government in 
their efforts to end the civil war over the negotiating table. A military commission advised the 
government on issues related to the armed forces. However, it was extremely difficult to 
defend the military institution when it made such tremendous errors during the last years of 
the civil war.49 These errors put the armed forces in a weak negotiation position. 
Civil society evolved as well. The FMLN continued their efforts to mobilize the 
masses. They created the Comite Permanente del Debate Nacional (CPDN - Permanent 
Committee of the National Debate) in an attempt to bring in all those national organizations 
that had rejected their communist ideologies in the past years. This committee also sought 
to promote civil society's involvement in the negotiated settlement through violent 
demonstrations. Most of the Salvadoran civil society had a different view. They went to the 
polls on five different occasions (1989-1991) and believed that military actions were not the 
appropriate solution to the socio-political problems of the country. Salvadorans reaffirmed 
this position after the 1989 Offensive when they did not support the FMLN's armed 
insurrection in San Salvador. By 1990, after the armed offensive in November, most of the 
Salvadoran people pushed the government and the FMLN to end the armed conflict through 
a peaceful debate. 
"See Appendix A., the meeting of Oaxtepec, 19 June 1990. 
48See Appendix A., the Negotiation Proposals in San Jose. 
49The assassination of the Jesuit priests in San Salvador, and the alleged corruption among high ranking 
officers. 
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During this period the Church was replaced in its role of mediator by the United 
Nations. The Catholic Church opted to support the Left and the CPDN. Other religious 
leaders from the Lutheran and Christian Churches also supported the position of the Catholic 
Church. These religious leaders openly accused the government and the armed forces of 
being against the peace talks. They also promoted international support for the FMLN's 
military operations, although they never admitted this posture and denied any direct 
connection with the Leftist insurgents. In sum, the Church did little to improve the negotiation 
process. Instead, the Church caused aggravation by their negative attitude toward the peace 
talks. 
Opposition parties came to support the negotiating position of the FMLN and pushed 
for the inclusion of political reforms in the peace accords. The government obtained limited 
support, but managed to convince the opposition parties that it was trying to attain political 
and judicial reforms in the accords. Political society played a vital and significant role 
throughout this negotiation period. The most relevant took place in September 1990 with the 
Inter-Party Dialogue Commission agreement, which asked for a revision of the rules 
governing the March 1991 legislative and municipal elections. These changes expanded the 
size of the legislative assembly from sixty to eighty-four seats and created more openings 
for leftist candidates. The Salvadoran political society supported the negotiations in April 
1991 and proposed a constructive formula for the role and function of the truth commission, 
and stood together to ward off FMLN efforts to change the procedures for constitutional 
amendment.50 
7. International Factors 
In January 1984, the Kissinger Commission report51 provided a consensus framework 
for U.S. policy toward El Salvador. The report had different political emphases within 
Washington, D.C. (Congress stressed human rights considerations and the Reagan 
administration emphasized support for the Salvadoran armed forces). This consensus held 
until 1989 when new administrations took office in El Salvador and the United States. The 
Bush administration clearly announced to the Salvadoran government that a negotiated 
solution was the only way to stop the armed conflict. 
50La Prensa Grafica Newspaper, San Salvador, El Salvador, June 13, 1991, p. 1. 
51The Kissinger Commission report of 1984 (the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America) favored 
the State Department strategy: El Salvador was important to U.S. interest; a victory of the FMLN was unacceptable; 
fighting the guerrillas should be left to the Salvadoran armed forces, with heavy U.S. financing. 
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After the Leftist offensive of 1989, the United States also admitted that the civil war 
did not have a military solution. Assistant Secretary of State Bernard W. Aronson stated at 
a Congressional hearing that "El Salvador needs peace, and the only path to peace is at the 
negotiating table."52 Those words showed a significant shift in U.S. position toward the 
Salvadoran armed conflict. Aronson recognized that the Reagan policy of isolating the FMLN 
militarily had failed and that it was time to pursue peace through dialogue. Many other United 
States officials agreed with Aronson. In testimony before the Senate, Secretary of State 
James A. Baker, III, stated that "in El Salvador, we believe that this is the year to end the 
war through a negotiated settlement that will guarantee a safe political space for all 
Salvadorans."53 A week later, General Maxwell R. Thurman, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. 
Southern Command, endorsed talks between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN to 
end the civil war, and stated his belief that the parties were on that course.54 
The turnabout in U.S. policy toward El Salvador was accomplished by Congress in 
1990, after the United Nations committed itself to play a major role in the negotiated 
settlement of the Salvadoran civil war in April 1990. Consequently, in October 1990, the U.S. 
Congress 1990 tied any military and economic aid to El Salvador not only to human rights 
issues, but to progress in the negotiation process. After this shift in U.S. policy, both sides 
tried to sell their positions to the U.S. Government and to other governments around the 
world. Cristiani's administration tried to distance itself from the right-wing party foundation 
and said they were committed to a negotiated solution. The FMLN offered to talk and to 
moderate their negotiation position. The Bush administration, at the end of 1980 and the 
beginning of 1990, put El Salvador on the back burner, due to events in Panama and 
Nicaragua. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe occupied the spotlight of U.S. 
foreign policy. In the end, the United States government played a helpful but tangential role 
in support of the negotiation process. 
Changes in the former Soviet Union played a larger role. In January 1989, the former 
Soviet Union announced to the FMLN that they could not afford military and economic aid 
"Assistant Secretary of State Aronson, prepared statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 
on Western Hemispheric Affairs, January 24, 1990, 5. 
"Secretary of State Baker, prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "U.S. Foreign 
Policy Priorities and FY 1991 Budget Request," Current Policy No. 1245 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 1, 1990), 5. 
^Testimony of General Thurman, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, stenographic transcript of 
hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 8, 1990. 
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and that the FMLN should pursue negotiations with the Salvadoran government.55 Glasnost 
(political reforms) and Perestroika (economic reforms) seemed to reinforce this trend. 
Mikhail Gorbachev's determination to improve relations with the United States prompted a 
dynamic withdrawal from Central America. The Soviets halted arms shipments to the 
Nicaraguan government in January 1989 and called on the FMLN to seek support from 
Western nations. This convinced the FMLN to come over to the negotiating table. 
During the offensive of 1989, the FMLN competed with the collapse of the Soviet 
empire for world attention. The Eastern bloc was moving away from totalitarian regimes and 
centralized economies. Cuba, a key FMLN ally, was becoming increasingly isolated from its 
communist allies and the Soviet Union's new thinking was prompting the FMLN to moderate 
its ideologies even further. The November 1989 Malta summit showed Washington, D.C. 
how far Moscow was willing to go to assure that it was not militarily supporting the FMLN. 
According to a French news report in late November 1989, the Soviets told Cuban and 
Nicaraguan high-ranking officials to stop supplying arms to the FMLN.56 After the Malta 
summit, President Bush accepted Soviet claims that they were not directly supplying the 
FMLN and were pressuring their allies to stop arms shipments to El Salvador.57 
The United Nations also played an important role. Throughout the negotiation 
process, the U.N. was actively involved and acted, at least in theory, as an impartial 
arbitrator. They helped negotiate the schedule that covered the actual implementation phase 
of the accords and set the deadline for the signing of the accords. ONUSAL (United Nations 
Observer Mission in El Salvador) would have the role of overseeing and supervising the 
implementation phase of the peace accords. 
Central American nations recognized that the future of the region lay in economic 
development and not in military disputes. The five Central American presidents, at a meeting 
in early December 1989, significantly strengthened President Cristiani's political position. For 
the first time, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega recognized the legitimacy of the Cristiani 
government. Violeta Chamorro's election in 1990 also impacted the negotiation process. 
A new government in Nicaragua increased the pressures on the FMLN to agree on laying 
"Washington Post. January 24, 1989, A15. 
56Washinqton Post, November 30, 1989, A37. 
57Washington Post. December 4, 1989, A1. 
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down its weapons. A senior rebel commander stated in the wake of the Nicaraguan elections 
that "the FMLN is feeling the need to end the war."58 
C. THE PROCESS 
Günther and Higley define elites as "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic 
positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and 
substantially."59 "Elites affect political outcome 'regularly' in that their individual points of 
view; and possible actions are seen by other influential persons as important factors to be 
weighed when assessing the likelihood of continuities, and changes in regimes and 
policies."60 In El Salvador, the elites of both commissions recognized each other's political 
points of view to assess the likelihood of the negotiation process. 
Günther and Higley proposed two basic but parallel dimensions in the structuring and 
functioning of elites - the extent of structural integration and the extent of value consensus. 
Structural integration involves the relative inclusiveness of informal and 
formal networks of communication, and influence among elite persons, 
groups, and factions. Value consensus involves the agreement among elites 
on formal and informal rules and codes of political conduct, and on the 
legitimacy of existing political institutions.61 
These two dimensions distinguish three types of national elites: disunified, 
consensually unified, and ideologically unified. Disunified elite is where structural integration 
and value consensus is minimal. Consensually unified elite is where structural integration 
and value consensus is relatively inclusive. Ideologically unified elite is where structural 
integration value consensus is seemingly monolithic. 
Before the negotiation process began in 1984, Salvadoran elites represented an 
ideologically unified elite population. Günther and Higley stated that in order to have a 
transformation from either disunified or ideologically unified elite to consensually unified elite, 
it must take two principle forms: settlement and convergence. 
5aWashinoton Post. February 27, 1990, A17. 
59Gunther and Higley, 8. 
50Gunther and Higley, 9. 
61Guntherand Higley, 8. 
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"Elite settlements are relatively rare events in which warring elite factions suddenly 
and deliberately reorganized their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic 
disagreements."62 "Elite convergence is a fundamental change that takes place within 
unconsolidated democracies. It is initiated when some opposing actions in the disunited 
elites that characterize such democracies discover that, by forming a broad electoral coalition 
they can mobilize a reliable majority of voters, win elections repeatedly, and thereby protect 
their interests by dominating government executive power."63 
The agreements between the government and the FMLN on formal rules of political 
conduct and on the legitimacy of existing political institutions settled the basic disagreements 
of both parties (Geneva on 4 April 1990, San Jose III on 26 July 1990, Mexico on 27 April, 
and New York on 25 September 1991). The signing of the peace accords on 16 January 
1992 proclaimed a more democratic El Salvador and represented an elite settlement. 
Günther and Higley proposed two sets of circumstances that appear to foster elite 
settlement. The first is a prior occurrence of a conflict where all factions suffered heavy 
losses. When these conflicts emerge, deeply divided elites tend to be more disposed to 
seek compromises than in other circumstances.64 In El Salvador, the civil war was a conflict 
in which no faction clearly triumphed. Social leveling tendencies that emerged after the 
Leftist offensive of 1989 made the FMLN elite recognize that renewed fighting might cost 
them their elite position. The second circumstance is a major crisis that threatens the 
resumption of widespread violence. Such crises may occur when the acting head of state's 
policy failures and power abuses bring elite discontent to the highest level.55 In El Salvador, 
this did not happen. With the election of President Cristiani, the government wanted to push 
for a negotiated solution. It was the FMLN military actions that threatened not only the 
resumption of widespread violence, but also the negotiation process.66 
Günther and Higley outlined four important settlement features: 
s2Gunther and Higley, 13. 
"Günther and Higley, 24. 
64Gunther and Higley, 25. 
"Günther and Higley, 25. 
66. Washington Post, November 20, 1989, A1. 
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Speed. "It appears that elite settlement are accomplished quickly or not at all. 
Facing a serious political crisis that threatens renewed elite warfare, a 
settlement involves intensive efforts to find a way out."67 After the Leftist 
offensive of 1989, the FMLN was pushed by civil society, by the former Soviet 
Union, and by other communist allies to formulate a different strategy to resolve 
the armed conflict. The FMLN's military and political position in the country was 
jeopardized by this military action, and forced the FMLN's General Command to 
consider concessions that they would not have endorsed in other circumstances. 
Face-to-Face, largely secret, negotiations among leaders of the major elite 
factions. "Through a combination of skills, desperation, and accidents, 
impasses were broken and crucial compromises were struck. The number of 
negotiating sessions involved in elite settlement was probably in the hundreds, 
as they required not only compromises between major factions but also 
agreements between them."68 From 1989 to 1992, twenty different face-to-face 
negotiating sessions took place in the Salvadoran process. Despite the two Left 
offensives and other major negotiation crises. Both parties on December 1991 
made crucial compromises. 
The drafting of written agreement. "Written agreements committed elite factions 
publicly to the concessions and guarantees made privately."69 The most 
important of all the written agreements signed by the government and the FMLN 
is the peace accord signed in Mexico on 16 January 1992. They represented 
the concessions, and guarantees of both parties. 
Predominance of experienced political leaders. "Their superior knowledge of 
issues and of how politics are played enables them to see what has to be done 
and how to do it. Moreover, long political experience often entails political 
learning: Recollection of costly previous conflicts appears to have induced 
leaders to avoid the risks inherent in a resumption of unrestrained conflict."70 
The FMLN negotiation commission had more political experience than their 
counterparts. FMLN elites recollected previous negotiation conflicts that 
occurred in past meetings, and used them to formulate their general strategy 
before they came to the negotiating table. 
Besides these procedural features,  Günther and  Higley suggested that elite 
settlement structures have similarities. They stated that in countries such as Colombia and 
;7Gunther and Higley, 15. 
"Günther and Higley, 16. 
3Gunther and Higley, 17. 
°Gunther and Higley, 18. 
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Venezuela where elite settlements occurred in the 1950s, each country had a low level of 
socioeconomic development. When this level of development prevailed, national elites 
enjoyed autonomy from mass constituency and pressures. "Elite factions and leaders could 
compromise on questions of principles without strong pressures to stand firm."71 "The 
importance of elite autonomy in fashioning settlements can also be seen in the secrecy of 
the negotiation they involved; settlements, it would appear, cannot be arranged in a 
democratic or mass-media fishbowl."72 Throughout the negotiation processes in El Salvador, 
the country's socioeconomic development was low. However, this did not mean that both 
parties had the autonomy to compromise on questions of principle without strong pressures 
to stand firm. 
Political autonomy does not necessarily come from internal mass following and 
pressures, but is also imposed by external actors. Throughout the negotiation process both 
sides received pressure from internal and external actors that compromised the autonomy 
of each negotiation commission. For example, the Legislative Assembly stood together in 
April 1991 to ward off FMLN's efforts to change constitutional amendment procedures. After 
the offensive of 1989 and 1990, the FMLN was pressured by the former Soviet Union and 
other communist allies to find a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. The FMLN 
negotiation commission also had to comply with the demands of its middle level commanders 
and its combatants in order to maintain control of their military apparatus. 
On the other hand, the government received pressure from the armed forces when 
it came to negotiate the purging and the restructuring of the military. The United States 
pressured the government by tying economic and military aid not only to human rights issues, 
but also to progress in the peace talks. 
Civil society pressured both parties to find a peaceful solution to the armed conflict, 
especially after the Leftist offensive of 1989. Both parties influenced each other with military 
or sabotage actions. Evidently, internal and external actors also limited the autonomy of each 
commission when it came to standing firm in their compromises and consensus. As a result, 
Günther and Higley's statement on this point does not hold strong in El Salvador. 
The elite settlement of 31 December 1991 did occur in a fishbowl of democracy and 
mass-media because the government and the FMLN agreed in Geneva that political parties 
"Günther and Higley, 19. 
72Gunther and Higley, 19. 
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and social organizations had to play a role in the consolidation of the peace talks. Günther 
and Higley stated that the presence of "triggering circumstances, subsequent processes, 
elite autonomy, and limited mass mobilization" are crucial for an elite settlement to take 
place. Once again, this does not follow the Salvadoran case. The Salvadoran elite 
settlement did not only begin under a limited elite autonomy or with a massive participation 
of social organizations, it took place while the fighting continued in the countryside. 
The consolidation of the Peace Accords on the 16th of January 1992 by the 
Salvadoran government and the FMLN's General Command was successful because 
relevant political events that took place around the world influenced the negotiating behavior 
and attitudes of both parties. Pressures put upon the FMLN by its communist allies, and 
pressures put upon the government by the United States and the United Nations motivated 
both parties to become more collaborative with each other. Moreover, after the Leftist 
offensive of 1989, evidently the Salvadoran armed conflict no longer had a win-lose 
proposition among the parties. The civil war had come to a stalemate. The self-analysis of 
the FMLN in 1989 showed that their military power and political influence over the population 
was declining, forcing the FMLN to move toward the negotiation solution. 
Civil society played a main role when it came to pressure both parties to come to 
negotiate and to overcome barriers in the peace talks. The FMLN was more influenced by 
these pressures than the government, especially after the Offensive of 1989. However, civil 
society strengthened President Cristiani's hand in promoting a more serious, and dynamic 
negotiation process between both parties. That process was assisted by the presence of 
a third party. A third party can be most effective when it is apolitical, legitimate, visionary, 
charismatic, conciliatory, knowledgeable of the internal factors causing the internal dispute, 
and from outside the country's boundaries. The involvement of a third party makes the 
negotiation process more dynamic, leaving little room for the situation to become stagnant. 
D. CQWCLUSIQM 
On January 16, 1992, El Salvador was left with many painful scars, but the country 
was anxious to start its new democratic life. Some individuals might wonder why the 
Salvadorans could not have come to terms sooner and thereby saved 12 years of violence, 
spared 75,000 lives, and avoided the disaster of civil war? It took the British over 600 years 
to go from the Magna Carta to an expanded franchise.   Along the way, they could not 
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manage to avoid the Wat Tyler's Rebellion, the Wars of the Roses, the English Civil War, 
Cromwell's Protectorate, and the massive violence exercised by the upper classes against 
the lower.73 By contrast, it took the Salvadoran "only" 60 years to go from the commercial 
revolution of 1870 to the collapse of the oligarchy in 1932 and another 60 years to realize that 
a democratic regime offered every Salvadoran a more reasonable political system with 
mutual guarantees. 
The purpose of the analysis was to show a detailed examination of why, how, and 
when the behavior of each of the national and international variables changed in each 
negotiation period. The following table shows how each variable behaved during both 
periods and how it affected the outcome of the peace process. A numerical rating has been 
chosen from zero to ten to show how influential each variable was. The least influential 
would be rated as zero and the most influential as ten. 
Table 1. Influential National and International Variables, 
in the Salvadoran Negotiation Process. 
Negotiation Period      Government    FMLN   A.F.    P.S.     C.S. Church I.V. Outcome 
Duarte 
(1981-1988) 4 2        4 2 8 6        3    Unsucc. 
Event 
Cristiani 
(1989-1992) 9 7        7 7        10 4        8      Succ. 
Event 
A.F.: Armed Forces 
C.S.: Civil Society 
P.S.: Political Society 
I.V.: International Variables 




With the limited support received by all the influential variables in the first period, the 
outcome of the process was a total disaster, an unsuccessful event. With the positive 
change in the behavior of each variable, the second process managed to be a successful 
event ending in the signing of the Peace Accords in Mexico on 16 January 1992. 
The Salvadoran armed conflict brought in many outside actors - the United States, 
the former Soviet Union, regional influences (especially Venezuela and Mexico), rebel 
supporters (Cuba and Nicaragua), and some Western European powers. These external 
actors often overwhelmed the locals with their own concerns, interests, and agendas. Some 
of these actors, if not all, tried to micromanage the Salvadoran crisis through diplomatic, 
economic, and military means but, in the end, it was the Salvadoran people who determined 
their own fate over the negotiating table. 
Peace finally came to Ei Salvador, but the civil war left more poverty, more 
delinquency, more social and economic problems, more corruption, and a loss of patriotic, 
moral and religious values. Despite these difficulties and the high cost in human and 
monetary terms, El Salvador moved to a new democratic phase via the honest and vigilant 
implementation of the Peace Accords. 
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IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF THE PEACE ACCORDS 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of this chapter are: 1) to examine the phases of the implementation 
process of the peace accords; 2) to analyze how national and international actors played an 
important role in the implementation of the accords; and 3) to assess the nature of the 
problems affecting the implementation process, so that other nations looking at El Salvador 
can learn from them. 
On February 16, 1992, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN reaffirmed the 
purpose of the Geneva agreements "to end the armed conflict through means of political 
negotiations at the shortest time possible; promote the democratization of the country; 
guarantee unrestricted human rights and; reunite the Salvadoran society."74 With the 
completion of the peace talks and the acknowledgment of the agreements in Caracas and 
New York, both parties reached a political settlement known as the Acuerdos de Paz de El 
Salvador (Peace Accords of El Salvador). The signing of these accords, under the 
verification of the United Nations, led the country into a new phase in its political history. The 
accords meant two things: the enlargement of socio-political expectations of the Salvadorans 
within a new democratic framework and with respect to their human rights, and a definite end 
to the civil war. Although the peace accords represent a blueprint for a more democratic El 
Salvador, they could fall victim to political maneuvering that might disrupt their 
implementation. 
The peace accords of 1992 tailored a dynamic cycle of political events. This dynamic 
cycle meant that if one political event was not executed on time, the next event would fall 
behind schedule, causing a slowdown of the entire implementation process. An execution 
calendar was formulated by both parties to make the process more expeditious and both 
agreed to follow it with ONUSAL verification. 
The accords were divided in nine chapters and six appendices.75 They included: 1) 
The Armed Forces; 2) The National Civil Police Force (CNP); 3) The Judicial System; 4) The 
Electoral System; 5) Social and Economic Topics; 6) Political Participation of the FMLN; 7) 
Cessation of the Armed Conflict; 8) United Nations Verification; and 9) Execution Calendar. 
74Geneva Agreements, 04 April 1990. 
"Acuerdos de Paz Document, Chapultepec: Mexico, 16 January 1992. 
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B. THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASES OF THE PEACE ACCORDS 
1. Phase One. (02 February 1992 - 31 October 1992) 
On the first of February 1992, the first stage of this phase began with the cessation 
of the armed conflict. ONUSAL's military delegation had the mission of verifying the 
separation of both parties military forces and supervising the activities of the existing police 
force. The armed forces and the FMLN could not: attack by air, sea or ground; perform 
military actions or patrols; occupy new military positions; perform any kind of reconnaissance 
missions or acts of sabotage. They could not perform any military activity that was judged 
by ONUSAL as being dangerous to the peace accords and/or to the civilian population. 
The next stage was to concentrate the conflicting military forces in separate places. 
The objective of this separation was to avoid armed confrontations between both sides, and 
to facilitate ONUSAL's missions. This concentration process took longer than was stipulated 
due to the negligence of the FMLN to comply with the cease-fire agreements.76 
On April 1992, serious delays arose in the implementation of key accord provisions, 
threatening the cease-fire.77 As delays and disputes developed over sensitive aspects of the 
accords, ONUSAL's civilian delegation came to play an important role. ONUSAL's verification 
responsibilities expanded to mediate the interpretation and implementation of the accords. 
To prevent a total breakdown, both sides turned to ONUSAL to act as a mediator. With the 
help of ONUSAL, both parties finally agreed to avoid activities that could threaten the 
accords. On May 1992, a public report released by ONUSAL stated that while both parts 
were responsible for delays and violations of the accords, the government bore responsibility 
for the most serious problems. This announcement embarrassed the government and 
obligated it to take its commitment more seriously. In June 1992, the government created a 
new set of agreements that increased both sides' commitment to the implementation 
process. 
The final stage of this phase came on 31 October 1992. On this day, the FMLN, 
under the supervision of ONUSAL, destroyed, at least in theory, all of its weapons. This 
event started the demobilization process of the FMLN's armed structure. Throughout the 
process, the FMLN behaved in a way that   endangered the consolidation of the peace 
6Acuerdos de Paz: Chapter VII. 
"FMLN's ex-combatants occupied land around the country that the government forces had forcibly evicted them 
for invading. Also, neither side concentrated their forces on time. Report of the Secretary-General on the ONUSAL, 
UN. Doc. S/23999 (New York: United Nations, 26 May 1992) pp. 2-3, 8-9. 
accords. The FMLN submitted a weapon inventory of some 4,000 arms. It was obvious that 
the FMLN had more weapons than it claimed. Most of the combatants concentrated in the 
places were old individuals, women, and children. These individuals represented only 40% 
of the total combatants. Also, the discovery of a FMLN's weapon arsenal in Managua, 
Nicaragua, made it clear that the Left desired to retain some arms as an insurance policy. 
After a series of delays caused by FMLN's middle commanders and field combatants, 
the demobilization was completed in December 1992. ONUSAL's large-scope presence, 
according to one official, "made it difficult for both sides to intensify the fighting or to walk 
away from the negotiating table. It was hard to fight in the presence of ONUSAL."78 Also, the 
power of ONUSAL to deploy its personnel anywhere in the country and to enter any military 
installation without prior notice made ONUSAL's mission dissuasive and/or preventive.79 
With the full demobilization of the FMLN's forces, the dynamic of the implementation 
process changed dramatically. Many political analysts though that the disappearance of the 
FMLN's military structure significantly weakened its position to insist upon government 
compliance. But this never happened because the FMLN, under ONUSAL supervision, 
managed to maintain its urban terrorist units armed and organized. The FMLN General 
Command would use these units any time they felt threatened by any aspect of the 
implementation process. The FMLN had not abandoned its strategy to use force any time its 
political, military, and economic interests were threatened.80 The demobilization of the armed 
force's anti-guerrilla units took place with delays but it was accomplished with ONUSAL's 
insistence to cling to the execution calendar. With the armed forces reduction to 50 percent 
and the FMLN's forces demobilized, Phase One ended, and the implementation process 
continued as scheduled. 
2. Phase Two (31 December 1992 - Present) 
After the cease-fire of 31 December 1992, the nation was ready to start its next 
implementation phase.   The consolidation of the accords and the democratization of El 
78
 Interview with ONUSAL official in San Salvador (Prensa Grafica Newspaper, San Salvador: El Salvador, 
29 May 1992). 
79Writer's personal knowledge. 
80Armed Forces Intelligence Report, San Salvador: El Salvador, 23 February 1993. 
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Salvador began on this historical date. In this phase, ONUSAL and COPAZ81 became 
responsible for overseeing and organizing different subcommissions to develop each 
pending topic of the accords. COPAZ and its subcommissions82 were tasked with promoting 
elite cooperation in order to facilitate the compliance of the pending accords. This 
compliance was to be developed in the following five ways: 
a. The Armed Forces 
The FMLN demanded the removal of any military officer known as a human 
rights violator. This removal process was named depuration (purging). As was agreed in 
the accords, the Comision Ad-hoc (Ad-hoc Commission) was to review the records of every 
officer and determine whether the officer should remain in the armed forces or be purged. 
The president was obliged to carry out the commission recommendations within sixty days. 
Another body appointed to oversee this purging was the Comision de la Verdad (the Truth 
Commission). This commission was responsible for the investigation of the most serious 
human rights violations perpetrated by both parties. Its findings would also be reported to 
the president. 
A number of institutional changes in the armed forces were promised under this 
accord. The armed forces had to make a significant reduction in its units, personnel, 
equipment, and expenses. The armed forces were also required to guide its doctrine based 
on subordination of military power to civilian authorities and respect for human rights. The 
most important changes were: the relocation of the intelligence unit to presidential control; 
the creation of a new doctrine based on constitutional reforms of 1991, limiting the military 
role to defend the country from external threats; the drafting of new principles and operating 
procedures for the military academy; a reduction of the armed forces from 90,000 to 31,000; 
the dissolution of special force units (Special Anti-Guerrilla battalions); and the constitution 
of a police force separate from the military and under civilian control.83 
51
 COPAZ was to be made up of two representatives each from the government and the FMLN, plus 
representatives from each of the political parties in the Legislative Assembly. Acuerdos de Instalacion de la Fase 
Transitoria de la Comision Nacional para la Consolidacion de la Paz (COPAZ), Mexico D.F.: Mexico, 11 October 
1991. 
""Subcommissions were formed to oversee (a) the redistribution of land to ex-combatants and residents of 
former conflict zones; (b) the creation of the CNP; (c) the preparation of electoral reforms; (d) the observance of 
human rights conditions; (e) the guarantee of freedom of expression; and (f) the implementation of rehabilitative 
programs for ex-combatants and civilians wounded in the War. 
"Acuerdos de Paz: Chapter I. 
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b. The Civilian National Police Force (CNP) 
The new civilian police force was the institution empowered to maintain the 
internal security and peace in El Salvador. Once formed, the CNP would operate out of the 
Ministry of the Interior, instead of the Defense Ministry, as had been done for forty-one years. 
The head of the police had to be a civilian appointed by the president. The legislative branch 
would have the power to dismiss the police director and the chief of state intelligence if 
serious human rights violations occurred in these institutions. The CNP had to be in place 
within twenty-one months from the signing of the accord, with an initial force of 5,700 men, 
and a final force of 10,000. All recruits would go through a new admission board formed and 
overseen by civilian authorities. Due to controversial disputes regarding the number of 
participants from each side, the final formula was that most of the recruits must be 
Salvadorans who had not participated in either side of the war, with an equal number of 
former FMLN and police combatants.84 
c. Electoral and Judicial Reforms 
The government and the FMLN previously agreed upon the electoral and 
judicial reforms of April 1991, which were ratified by the Salvadoran legislature. The Peace 
Accords added a new judicial provision that outlined the creation of a more professional and 
nonpolitical Judicial Training School for judges and prosecutors. The main changes to the 
judicial system were the election of Supreme Court justices by a two-thirds majority of the 
Legislative Assembly, commitment of 6 percent of the national budget to strengthen the ill- 
equipped judicial system, and the election of a government human rights prosecutor by two- 
third majority of the Legislative Assembly. The most important electoral reform was the 
creation of the Central Electoral Council.85 
d. Economic Reforms 
The chapter on economic reforms called for the implementation of land 
reforms already mandated in the constitution, but never had been carried out. State lands 
would be distributed to agricultural workers who were former FMLN combatants. The 
government promised not to evict tenants of lands in conflict zones until a mechanism for 
resolving ownership issues was formulated. One provision permitted the state to buy land 
from absentee owners and redistribute it.   If the owner did not wish to sell, the current 
84Acuerdos de Paz: Chapter II. 
"Acuerdos de Paz: Chapter lll-IV. 
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tenants would be given land elsewhere. The government was also committed to present a 
Plan Nacional para la Reconstruccion (National Reconstruction Plan).   The plan made 
special provisions for those sectors affected by the war at a cost of $1.8 billion.86 
e. Political Participation of the FMLN 
The most important points of the chapter on political participation of the FMLN 
were the adoption of legislative reforms that would guarantee the FMLN ex-combatants their 
political and civic rights and their incorporation into the political structure; the written authority 
allowing the FMLN to have its own radio broadcasting station; and the legalization of the 
FMLN as a political party. These reforms would not take place until the FMLN was fully 
demobilized.87 
With these guidelines, COPAZ and its subcommission, together with the Legislative 
Assembly, started to develop plans and mechanisms to comply with each pending accord. 
If any of these organizations developed a viable plan, the government had the responsibility 
of executing it. If delays occurred, ONUSAL provided a climate of security and confidence 
for both parties. ONUSAL served as the communication channel, provided an authoritative 
interpretation of the accords, proposed solutions when crises developed, requested 
concessions and commitment from both parties, and stepped in to verify aspects of the 
accords. These ONUSAL supportive actions helped COPAZ and its subcommissions to 
avoid, and sometimes eliminate, stalemates encountered in the conference rooms. Despite 
ONUSAL efforts to maintain a climate of security and confidence, some of the pending 
accords created internal disputes between COPAZ subcommission members. These 
disputes slowed down the implementation process and caused some aspects of the accords 
not to be accomplished such as: the land distribution program; the development of the 
National Security Academy (later on slowing down the displacement of the CNP's forces 
around the country); the incorporation of the FMLN in the socio-political structures of the 
country; and the total disarmament and disappearance of the FMLN military apparatus. 
Despite these problems, the government, the FMLN, the people, and ONUSAL knew 
that the full implementation of the pending accords was necessary to promote peace and the 
consolidation of democracy. 
86Acuerdos de Paz: Chapter V. 
"Acuerdos de Paz: Chapter VI. 
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C. THE ELECTIONS OF 1994 
In 1993, the FMLN became a legal political party. This event opened a new page in 
Salvadoran history because Marxist-Leninist politicians joined the country's political race. 
The political competition in the runoff to the 1994 presidential election was about to 
demonstrate how Salvadoran political actors were willing to compete by peaceful, democratic 
means.38 
In May 1993, a turnabout in the political race took place when the Truth Commission 
reported its findings to President Cristiani. Important political elites were mentioned, forcing 
the FMLN and other political parties to offer new candidates. The individuals cited in the 
report could not run for any political office. 
With the help of ONUSAL and COPAZ, the government rushed to carry out the 
pending accords before the elections of 1994, but this proved impossible. The 
implementation of the pending accords had fallen behind schedule. Even with the full 
compliance of the accords, El Salvador was destined to go through a period of intense 
political competition. In this political race, the FMLN faced its biggest challenge in 
transforming itself into a trusted, viable, and peaceful political party. The basic question was 
whether the Left would unite for the 1994 elections or fragment.89 
ARENA underwent similar turmoil after the death of the founding leader of the 
government party, D'Aubuisson, Roberto. A split inside the party's structure was obvious. 
There were those who wanted the party to return to its initial principles (hard-line 
anticommunist nationalism) and those who wanted to continue with Cristiani's line (more 
moderate and populist). These political uncertainties made this election more absorbing than 
others. Before the campaigns started, all parties agreed to sign a settlement, in the 
presence of a ONUSAL representative, stating that the upcoming elections would be free, 
fair, and secure.90 
In 1994, El Salvador witnessed the Elecciones del Siglo (Elections of the Century), 
so named because they were to take place in a political context created after the signing of 
the Peace Accords that left the political spectrum open to any legal political party.  The 
""Linda Robinson, "Why Central America is Still Not Democratic," SAIS Review, Summer-Fall 1993/Vol. 
12, No.2. 
""Ruben Zamora, former member of the FDR, joined the Democratic Convergence and tried to capture 
the center-left portion of the Christian Democrat Party, but he did not succeed. 
90Compromiso Politico, San Salvador: El Salvador, 11 January 1994. 
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Elections of the Century were about to bring an overall change to the Salvadoran political 
structure, because the people were about to elect new officials for every executive and 
legislative office. 
The political representation in the election included parties from the far-right to the 
far-left.91 The Left formed a coalition that included the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario 
(MNR - National Revolutionary Movement), the Convergencia Democratlca (CD - Democratic 
Convergence), and the FMLN. The elections began on 20 March 1994. Despite the 
difficulties that people encountered when they went to register to vote, millions of 
Salvadorans went to the polls. The final vote showed that the top three parties were ARENA 
with 49.30% of the vote, the Leftist Coalition with 24.95%, and the Christian Democratic 
Party ( PDC) with 16.39%. No party was declared the winner because the constitution 
mandated that the minimum percentage for victory must be 50% plus one vote. The 
Electoral Council announced a runoff between the two top parties on 24 April. In the runoff, 
ARENA received 818,264 votes (68.35%) and the Leftist Coalition, 378,980 votes (31.65%).92 
ARENA was legally declared the winner and Armando Calderon Sol became the newly 
elected president. 
As a result of the legislative elections, ARENA had 39 members of Congress, the 
FMLN had 21, the PDC had 18, the Partido de Conciliation Nacional (PCN - National 
Conciliation Party) had 4, the CD had 1, and the Movimiento Unificado (MU - Unified 
Movement) had 1. Once again, ARENA had control of the Legislative Assembly, but this 
time with a stronger opposition, represented primarily by the FMLN and the CD. The 
presence of the FMLN in the Legislative Assembly will make the Assembly's work more 
dynamic and more challenging. In the municipal elections, ARENA won more than the 80 
percent of the mayoral seats. The other 20 percent were divided among the FMLN, the PDC, 
the PCN. 
The Coalition declared an electoral fraud, but former ONUSAL Mission Chief Augusto 
Ramirez Ocampos publicly manifested his satisfaction with the electoral process. He stated 
that there was no space for an electoral fraud.93 His position was ratified by international 
91Estudio Socio-Politico de la Universidad Catolica Centroamericana. San Salvador: El Salvador, 22 
February 1994. 
92La Prensa Grafica Newspaper, San Salvador: El Salvador, 28 April 1994, p. 6-8. 
93La Prensa Grafica, 23 March 1? 
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observers spread throughout the country who were also pleased with the results and the 
conduct of the electoral process. After these public declarations, the Leftist Coalition, 
without further objection, accepted the results of the vote. 
The newly elected government took office on 1 May 1994 with a new agenda known 
as Plan Nacional de Gobiemo para el Desarrollo Pleno de El Salvador (National Plan for the 
Development of El Salvador).94 Its purposes were to consolidate a reconstruction process 
of a new modern, humanized, and democratic Salvadoran society; to prepare the country for 
future political, social and economic challenges; and to comply with the pending peace 
accords. Within this plan, the government formulated a national objective to join all sectors 
of society in the construction of a peaceful and permanent consolidation of El Salvador's 
democracy. To reach this objective, the government unveiled a plan for: (a) the 
consolidation of a representative democracy; (b) the reenforcement of human rights and 
public security; (c) the stimulation of economic growth; and (d) the promotion of civic, 
spiritual, and patriotic values. 
Opposition forces under the leadership of the FMLN presented two sociopolitical 
plans in the Legislative Assembly. The first would consolidate the pending accords and 
encourage the participation of all Salvadorans in the county's political structure. The second 
would guarantee the security of the people; transform the agriculture-industrial sectors; 
promote the socio-economic development of the people; reward individual initiative; and 
support democracy. 
The FMLN has used various ways to pressure the new government to comply with 
the pending accords. The FMLN has used the Legislative Assembly to approve or 
disapprove bills passed by the president and is more likely to approve those bills that fulfill 
their interests. Either way, opposition parties will continue to use the Movimineto Social 
Organizado (MSO - Organized Social Movements)95 to push their positions. The rest of the 
minority parties in the Assembly will play an important role any time a majority party looks for 
a coalition partner. 
After one year, El Salvador, under the government of President Calderon Sol, has 
gone through a variety of changes.   On the political side, the Coalition in the Legislative 
94This plan was based on the Plan for National Reconstruction (San Salvador: El Salvador, 21 July 1991) 
created by former President Alfredo Cristiani. 
95An organization formed by labor unions and other mass organizations. Its purpose reflects the same 
objectives that prevailed during the 1970s with the mass movements in San Salvador. 
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Assembly, through the MSO, developed a well-orchestrated strategy to promote popular 
dissatisfaction against the government. The MSO demonstrations in San Salvador pressed 
for compliance with the pending accords. The most mentioned are the land distribution plans 
and the existence of former armed forces personnel in the CNP. On the other hand, the 
ideological differences of the FMLN General Command finally exploded. It became divided 
when some of its political representatives in Congress were elected to the Legislative 
Assembly Staff. Some members of the General Command did not approve these political 
appointments and, two months later, the FMLN was divided in two factions -- social- 
democrats and orthodox Marxist-Leninists. 
Finally, political settlements in the Legislative Assembly will be reached only to 
remedy problems in the short-run. Political organization and individual interests dominate 
the political framework of the Salvadoran elite, a behavior that harms not only the 
consolidation of democracy, but also the full implementation of the peace accords. 
On the social side, the country is facing new problems, most of them effects of the 
post-Cold War period. The presence of "street gangs" and the unrestricted growth of 
delinquency threaten citizens' lives and the consolidation of democracy. The CNP is 
incapable of solving this problem, not because its members are not trained or do not have 
the resources, but because the delinquents outnumber them and possess more 
sophisticated weapons. The massive import of weapons during the civi! war enabled these 
individuals to procure weapons. Also, a vast majority of ex-combatants preferred to obtain 
money through the use of force, instead of going to work. The civil war has also promoted 
a loss of moral, civic, and social values. El Salvador, at the present moment, does not 
possess the moral, civic, and social values to consolidate its democratic system. 
On the military side, the armed forces of El Salvador continue to support the 
mandates written in the constitutional reforms of 1992. The military has moved toward a new 
educational and professional doctrine based on three aspects. The first aspect is 
preservation of the military. The missions of the armed forces are now based on the 
Constitution of El Salvador and new institutional laws. The military has increased its efforts 
to promote better relations with different sectors of society and other national organizations. 
This has promoted a climate of truth and harmony. The Salvadoran armed forces, jointly 
with the U.S. armed forces, have developed a long-term plan, Fuertes Caminos (Strong 
Paths), to enhance this civil-military relation around the country. 
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The second aspect is the reinforcement of the military. Through a new professional 
framework, the military is developing new educational programs that will enhance the 
formation and the specialization of its members. The armed forces have been restructured 
to fit the new country's democratic system and have formulated new military laws to comply 
with new judicial reforms. 
The third aspect is the consolidation of the military. The premise of this consolidation 
is that the Salvadoran armed forces need to accept the weaknesses of the past to play a 
better role in the new democratic system. The military will converge with the rest of the 
Salvadoran society to demonstrate that they are willing to obey the mandates given by the 
chief of the armed forces and the Salvadoran Constitution. 
On the economic side, the government has implemented new economic plans aimed 
at promoting more economic growth. Economic growth does not come quickly after 12 years 
of civil war, and the government is working very hard to promote international investments. 
The country needs to have a higher level of socio-economic development, a stronger 
economic infrastructure, and full implementation of the pending accords to promote a 
peaceful democratic consolidation. 
D. ANALYSIS 
When the peace accords ending El Salvador's 12 years of civil war were signed in 
Mexico in 1992, the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali declared that 
the agreements were "a revolution achieved by negotiations."96 The government and the 
FMLN declared their satisfaction with the peace accords for different reasons. The FMLN 
emphasized the revolutionary nature of the reforms, while the government stressed the 
achievement of peace and the preservation of constitutional order. Few Salvadorans have 
spoken out against the accords. However, in the months after the cease-fire, the euphoria 
was replaced by caution and distrust as the full demobilization of the FMLN, the total 
incorporation of FMLN's combatants to social life, and economic reforms fell way behind 
schedule. 
The peace accords provided a blueprint for a more democratic El Salvador, but they 
were not self-executing. The new rules of the game continued to be defined through political 
^Javier Perez de Cuellar left the United Nations on the first of January 1992, and was replaced by Boutros 
Boutros Ghali. Speech by UN. Secretary-General, "La Larga Noche ha Llegado a su Fin," (Chapultepec: Mexico, 
16 January 1992). 
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maneuvering and arduous negotiations over implementation. These and other challenges 
to the implementation process raised the question of whether the accords truly represented 
a new socio-political pact among Salvadorans, a temporary elite settlement, or a superficial 
consensus imposed by external factors.97 
Different national and international actors have played very important roles in the 
implementation of pending accords and the transition to democracy in El Salvador. ONUSAL 
became a very important international agency whose initial role was to verify the agreements 
on human rights. But, as delays and disputes over politically sensitive aspects of the 
accords develop, ONUSAL's responsibilities will expand to mediate the interpretation and 
implementation of the accords. The most important role played by ONUSAL was to facilitate 
the consolidation of the peace accords by strengthening domestic structures that will prevent 
the recurrence of conflict. COPAZ also contributed to this effort by consolidating some 
aspects of the peace accords. COPAZ and its subcommissions tried their best to comply 
with their mandate. 
Despite the efforts of ONUSAL and COPAZ, there is evidence that the accords 
remain full of pitfalls. Important elements contributing to these problems include the lack of 
adequate representation and knowledge of the government commission in the negotiating 
table; the dearth of political commitment and consensus to implement reforms; the paucity 
of competent verification mechanisms of ONUSAL and domestic bodies; the inability of 
international'agencies to deliver on time technical, economic, and human assistance; and 
the reliance on international actors to resolve internal problems. It is crucial that other 
nations, looking to El Salvador as an example for future conflict resolution, understand the 
nature of these implementation problems so they can obtain better results in becoming a 
more democratic society and have a more sustainable peace than El Salvador. 
Those who represented the government in the negotiation process cannot be fully 
blamed for the gaps in the peace accords. These gaps would not have emerged if the 
members of the negotiating commission would have had more adequate knowledge of how 
to handle different political, economic, social, and military issues. The representation of 
different social sectors or government branches in the negotiating commission could have 
precluded these gaps. These gaps delayed the implementation process and the country's 
7Baloyra, 77. 
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democratic consolidation. These problems could have been solved, not in the 
implementation process, but at the negotiating table. 
Another problem stemmed from the lack of political consensus (and insufficient 
commitment to consensus-building). This issue relates to the problems of enforcing political 
commitment and encouraging consensus building among Salvadoran political society and 
institutions. One important area in which the government lacked the political determination 
to uphold its obligations under the accords was the purging of the military. When the Ad-hoc 
Commission called for the removal of virtually all the military high command, political activists 
triggered a strong challenge to the accords. The disunity of opposition elites to promote a 
political settlement also promoted an inadequate environment for full compliance with the 
accords. Less notorious, but more damaging to the peace accords, were the delays in the 
creation of the CNP. Despite the vital importance of the CNP and the Academia National 
de Seguridad Publica (ANSP - National Academy for Public Security), the creation of these 
two institutions was frustrated by the lack of economic funds promised by many allied 
countries; the lack of consensus among COPAZ subcommission members responsible for 
the development of the CNP (opposition parties led by the FMLN lack the political will to 
promote a consensus);98 and the government's inability to promote a fast deployment of the 
CNP. The CNP was scheduled to begin its deployment after the demobilization of the FMLN, 
to assure their security and impartial investigation of crimes. The ANSP opened four months 
late because of the inability of the subcommission to formulate, on time, an implementation 
strategy and the lack of funds or facilities available to the government. Another important 
reform blocked by a lack of political commitment was the establishment of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman's office, which later had to take the role carried out by the Human Rights 
Division of ONUSAL A lack of government funding and the willingness of the political elites 
to converge in the roles of the Ombudsman's office impeded the start of its operation. 
Some of the crises confronting the implementation of the peace accords have 
revolved around the land tenure issue, but the most damaging long-term deficiency of the 
accords relates to the inadequate reforms of the judicial system. This problem did start in 
the negotiation process. Neither the United Nations nor the members of both commissions 
provided this area with the same leadership as they did on issues related to the police and 
the military. It was not until several months into the implementation process that ONUSAL 
"Interview with General Adoifo O. Blandon, former member of the CNP subcommission, 01 January 
1995. 
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and the government realized that the Salvadoran judicial system required a major overhaul. 
The constitutional reforms of 1991 did little to remedy these basic problems and, while the 
reforms did call for a more professional and independent selection process for justices, 
judges and prosecutors, the specific selection procedures were left unspecified. The reforms 
left also untouched the extremely hierarchical structure of the courts that enables the 
Supreme Court to control legal decisions and the administration of lower courts. 
ONUSAL increased its efforts to guide reforms within the justice system. However, 
its success depended totally on the cooperation of the existing judiciary. ONUSAL's oversight 
of judicial and police authorities was disabled because it lacked authority in this area. This 
issue was not included in the peace accords. The Supreme Court president repeatedly 
expressed his opinion that the peace accords did not apply to the judiciary because they 
were signed only by the executive branch and the FMLN. This situation could have been 
avoided with more explicit responsibilities to the judiciary and representation of the judiciary 
in the government's negotiation commission. The FMLN negotiation commission did not 
push this issue for two reasons: it was not among its political interests as was the case of 
military and police reforms; and, through this controversial problem, they will continue to push 
their human rights issues and promote mass dissatisfaction against the government. 
Verification mechanism were also inadequate. COPAZ failed to comply with the 
verification and the implementation of the peace accords because its functioning was slow, 
its organization deficient, and its management of less utility than anticipated." The 
agreement to create COPAZ (in which the FMLN could participate) served as an important 
guarantee to the guerrillas. It guaranteed that the implementation of the accords would 
receive the necessary national and governmental attention. Under this agreement, 
subcommissions were established to formulate mechanisms and plans to comply with the 
pending accords. 
The most prevalent weakness of COPAZ is linked to the inclusion of political parties 
from a wide range of ideological perspectives. The variety of representation was intended 
to encourage consensus decision making, however, this arrangement created a stalemate, 
as three parties voted with the government and three against. This deadlock generated 
disputes, relatively little consensus building, and serious delays to the implementation 
process.  COPAZ's subcommissions also confronted the same problems in their decision 
9Robinson, 92. 
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making process.'00 Furthermore, the inefficiency of COPAZ and its subcommissions 
increased with the lack of technical expertise to deal effectively with different issues. Also, 
members lacked the authority of their political party to exhort compromises. The end result 
of this situation was that COPAZ only provided input to the implementation process and did 
little to verify the final output. Despite COPAZ's limited effort to comply with its mission, in 
almost all cases, final decisions were either made by the government or worked out in 
bilateral negotiations both parties and with ONUSAL mediation. 
ONUSAL also fell short in its verification mission. ONUSAL had avoided making 
public criticisms of the government on human rights matters and the FMLN on the existence 
of its urban-terrorist units and of armed combatants inside former conflicting areas. 
Furthermore, ONUSAL failed to distinguish between cases in which investigations pointed 
to state or guerrilla involvement and those cases that were examples of common crime. 
Further problems were created by the inability of international agencies to deliver on- 
time technical, economic, and human assistance. Although ONUSAL became the leading 
U.N. mission in El Salvador, it depended upon the main technical assistance agency of the 
United Nations, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). This agency coordinated 
the material and technical assistance needed for institutional building. UNDP was called to 
respond to demands it could not handle because UNDP generally works with governments 
and carries on development programs rather than emergency relief.101 The formation of new 
institutions in El Salvador, particularly the new civil police force, required technical assistance 
programs to be carried out in close consultation not only with the government, but also with 
the FMLN. When contingencies arose, such as the logistic support needed to transport 
FMLN's ex-combatant from camps during the cease-fire, UNDP was not able to respond as 
quickly as needed. These experiences suggest that the U.N. should either empower special 
missions such as ONUSAL by providing the necessary materials and technical assistance 
or focus attention on how UNDP can respond more quickly and deal more effectively with 
non-state actors. 
Allied countries also failed to provide the economic aid that they had promised during 
the negotiation process. This foreign economic aid was necessary to comply with some 
aspects of the pending accords, such as the development of the Academy of National 
^Interview with General Blandon, 22 January 1995. 
101Robinson, 23. 
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Security and the land distribution programs. With its limited economic resources, the 
government decided to comply with some of the most important aspects of the accords, but 
this effort was not enough. Ex-combatants from the armed forces and the FMLN demanded 
their land; civil society demanded the rapid deployment of the CNP, but the government did 
not have the money to meet everyone's demands. 
Excessive reliance on international organizations created special problems. Through 
the United Nations, the international community was called either to resolve issues that could 
not be resolved by consensus or to verify the implementation of measures on which tenuous 
consensus was reached. The presence of ONUSAL built the confidence of the Salvadoran 
civil society, whose citizens expressed a distrust of governmental authorities. As a result, 
the victims of violent acts were more willing to report their cases to ONUSAL than to the 
Salvadoran judicial or police authorities. Another stunning example of reliance on 
international actors is the unrivaled Truth Commission. The government and the FMLN 
agreed that the three members of the commission had to be foreigners named by the U.N. 
Secretary-General to ensure their objectivity. The findings of this commission stimulated an 
enormous debate about the nature and the extent of abuses perpetrated by both sides. Any 
recommendations for prosecutions in particular cases were undercut by the amnesty law of 
1993. The Salvadoran people were getting used to seeing external actors taking control of 
internal disputes, especially with issues related to human rights, and whenever a stalemate 
existed in any negotiation process. 
President Calderon Sol, after one year in office, has worked to consolidate the peace 
accords and to make El Salvador a more democratic nation. Nonetheless, Calderon Sol and 
his administration will face future political, economic, and social challenges that will need to 
be worked out by Salvadoran social and political sectors. 
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V.  THE FUTURE OF EL SALVADOR (1995 -1999) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will use Dahl's theoretical framework to analyze how El Salvador's 
democratic system has evolved from 1932 to 1995, and to examine a number of problems 
that need to be solved to strengthen the Salvadoran process of democratic consolidation. 
After the elections of 1994, Salvadorans learned that without a democratic system 
the country had little hope of overcoming the lethal legacies of authoritarianism, terrorism, 
subversion, and civil war. Although Salvadorans may be blamed for the creation of these 
legacies, they also deserve most of the credit for giving themselves a new life. Salvadorans 
understand that without the full implementation of the peace accords, the consolidation of 
El Salvador's democratic system can never be achieved. The consolidation of democracy 
in El Salvador is not only bound to the implementation of the accords, but also to other 
political, social, and economic conditions. J. Samuel Valenzuela characterized a democratic 
consolidation process as "a series of confrontations between actors in which impediments 
(i.e., the existence of nondemocratic tutelary powers, the presence of 'reserved domains' of 
policy, etc.) to the minimal workings of a formal democracy are removed, resulting in the 
generalized perception that the new regime will continue well into the foreseeable future."102 
Even with the end of the civil war, many political analysts see the consolidation of democracy 
in El Salvador as an extremely troublesome process. 
B. ANALYSIS 
Robert A. Dahl presents eight requirements for the success of a democratic 
system.103 These requirements can be applied to El Salvador to examine if the country has 













Table 2. Some Requirements for a Democracy 
(El Salvador 1995) 
Freedom to form and join organization  Yes 
Freedom of expression Yes 
Right to Vote   Yes 
Eligibility for public office Yes 
Right of political leaders to compete for support  Yes 
Right of political leaders to compete for votes Yes 
Alternative sources of information    Yes 
Free and fair elections   Yes 
Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference   Yes 
Sources: Requirements taken from Dahl, Polyarchy; Ratings by author based on analysis 
in text. 
It is important to point out that some of these requirements existed in El Salvador 
before the elections of 1994. Five of these requirements were fulfilled during the legislative 
elections of 1982 (freedom of the people to join and form organizations, right to vote, 
eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support/votes, and free and 
fair elections). The other three were consummated with the appearance of new political 
parties, such as the FMLN in 1993; the creation of the FMLN radio broadcasting station in 
1992; and the presence of more opposition parties in the Legislative Assembly after the 
elections of 1994. This showed that El Salvador moved from a pseudo-democracy (1932- 
1982) to an unconsolidated democracy (1982-1995).104 No one can deny that the country is 
more democratic than it was six decades ago. However, Salvadoran society needs to focus 
on consolidating and improving its newly democratic regime. 
Dahl argued that "the chance that a country will be governed at the national level for 
any considerable period by a regime in which the opportunities for public contestation are 
available to the great bulk of the population (that is, a Polyarchy) depends on at least seven 
sets of complex conditions."105 Dahl's analysis used a rating system from zero to ten for 
each condition. He assumed that any country ranked in the upper rates was more amenable 
to becoming a polyarchy than those ranked in the lower rates.106 
104GuntherandHigley, 3-8. 
,05Dahl, 202. 
106 Dahl, 203. 
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Table 3. Conditions Favoring Polyarchy 
(El Salvador 1994) 
Conditions 10     987654321 
I. Historical sequence 5 
II. The socioeconomic order: 
A. Access to 
1. Violence 7 
2. Socioeconomic 
sanctions 10 
B. Type of economy 
1. Agrarian 7 
2. Commercia-lndustrial....10 
IN. The level of socio-economic 
development 3 
IV. Equalities and inequalities 
1. Objective 6 
2. Subjective: Relative 
deprivation 7 
V. Subcultural Pluralism 
1. Amount 9 
2. If marked or high 
VI. Domination by a foreign 
power 4 
VII. Beliefs of political activist 
1. Institutions of Polyarchy 
are legitimate 7 
2. Only unilateral authority 
is legitimate 7 
3. Polyarchy is effective in 
solving major problems 3 
4. Trust in others 2 
5. Political relationships are 
strictly competitive 2 
strictly cooperative 3 
cooperative-competitive 2 
6. Compromise necessary and 
desirable 2 
Sources: Conditions taken from Dahl, Polyarchy; Ratings by author, based on the 
following explanation in text. 
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C. EXPLANATION 
1. Condition I - Historical Sequence. 
Dahl stated that historical sequences are used to show if a whether a country has the 
historical background to reach polyarchy. Two aspects were examined the specific path or 
sequence of changes of a regime and the way in which a new regime was inaugurated. Dahl 
presents three possible paths to Polyarchy:107 
1. Liberation precedes inclusiveness: 
A. A closed hegemony increases opportunities for public contestation and 
thus transformed into a competitive oligarchy. 
B. The competitive oligarchy is then transformed into a Polyarchy by 
increasing the inclusiveness of the regime. 
2. Inclusiveness precedes liberalization: 
A. A closed hegemony becomes inclusive. 
B. The inclusive hegemony is then transformed into a Polyarchy by 
increasing opportunities to public contestation. 
3. Shortcut:   A closed hegemony is abruptly transformed into a Polyarchy by a 
sudden grant of universal suffrage and rights of public contestation. 
Dahl assumed that Path One was more likely than the other two to produce the 
degree of mutual security required to promote a polyarchy. In El Salvador, it was the 
economic elites (oligarchy) who developed the country's political rules and conditions from 
1837 to 1979. 108 The prevailing political system of this time was a competitive oligarchy. 
Second, "as additional social strata were admitted into politics they were more easily 
socialized into the norms and practices of competitive politics already developed among the 
elites . . ."109 Although the political apparatus was controlled by the oligarchy, public 
contestation opened up in the country and the people participated in the electoral processes 
from 1932 to 1979. Later, with the legislative election of 1982, the competitive oligarchy 
increased the inclusiveness of the Salvadoran people in the regime when the political 
apparatus was liberated (any political party was invited to participate in the electoral race). 
The "Elections of the Century" in 1994 reaffirmed this argument. 
107Dahl, 34. 
,08Dahl, 36. 
109 Dahl, 36. 
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Dahl proposed that "the first path is no longer open to most countries with hegemonic 
regimes, and that the liberalization of near-hegemonies will run serious risk of failure 
because of the difficulties, under conditions of universal suffrage and mass politics, of 
working out a system of mutual security." Democratic history in El Salvador is almost non- 
existent, but this does not prevent the country from having the necessary political tools to 
formulate a system of mutual security. 
Dahl also stated that "the process of inauguration most auspicious for a polyarchy is 
one that transforms previously legitimate hegemonic forms and structures into the forms and 
structures suitable for political competition and thus produces no lasting cleavages or 
widespread doubts about the legitimacy of the new regime."110 This transformation occurred 
in 1984, when Jose Napoleon Duarte became the new freely elected president. His 
government was chosen by legitimate forms and structures suitable for political competition. 
Given El Salvador's turbulent history with democracy, it rates a 4 for historical sequence. 
2. Condition II - The Socioeconomic Order. 
Dahl suggested that "the likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition 
increase as the resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the 
resources of an opposition."111 In El Salvador, the resources available to the government for 
suppression were neutralized by the creation of the Civil National Police; the doctrinal change 
of the armed forces; and the separation of the armed forces from internal security (under the 
peace accords). Dahl also suggested that "the likelihood that a government will tolerate an 
opposition increases with a reduction in the capacity of the government to use violence or 
socioeconomic sanctions to suppress an opposition."112 This was also neutralized after the 
signing of the peace accords, although opposition parties continue to perpetrate socio- 
political violence through the army of political masses in the streets of San Salvador. 
Dahl also proposed that a polyarchy is unlikely to be maintained without a pluralistic 
political order and with a centrally dominated social order. These two conditions create a 
hegemonic regime. Dahl also proposed that a polyarchy is attained when the use of violence 






After the end of the armed conflict, El Salvador moved from its suppression period (1932- 
1979) to a more favorable democratic stage. The government neither has the resources to 
impose repression nor the power to impose illegal socioeconomic sanctions. Since 1992, 
ONUSAL has monitored and ratified these conditions. 
Dahl classified two basic agrarian societies. The most prevalent is a traditional 
peasant society that has a great deal of inequality, hierarchy, and political hegemony. The 
other is a free farmer society considered egalitarian and more suitable for a polyarchy.114 He 
suggested that "the main factor determining the direction of an agrarian society are: norms 
about equality, the distribution of land, and military techniques."115 After the implementation 
of the first agrarian reform,116 the country started its path toward a free farmer society, but 
the reform was challenged by the escalation of the civil war. The government and the FMLN 
included the topic of land distribution in the peace accords with the goal to remedy the 
extreme inequality in distribution of land, wealth, and estate among Salvadoran society. 
Dahl mentioned that "private ownership is neither a necessary nor sufficient for a 
pluralistic social order and hence for public contestation and polyarchy."117 Dahl also 
suggested that a polyarchy will be more likely to occur with a decentralized economy rather 
than with a highly centralized economy, no matter what form of ownership. Despite the 
control of the economy by the oligarchy (1837-1979), El Salvador's economic history shows 
that a decentralized economy has prevailed in the country since its independence. With the 
end of the armed conflict, the economic system of El Salvador will continue to be even more 
decentralized (President Calderon Sol new economic plan). Based on the above analysis, 
El Salvador rates a 6 for access to violence; a 10 for access to socioeconomic sanctions; 
a 7 for agrarian economy; and a 10 for commercial-industrial economy. 
""Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), chaps. 8 and 9; Kaare Svalastoga, 
Social Differentiation (New York: David McKay, 1965), chap. 3. 
,15Dahl, 60. 
116An agrarian reform created by Jose Napoleon Duarte in 1982 and ratified by the Legislative Assembly. This 
reform had the goal to distribute land among the lower and middle class. Land areas with more than 245 hectares 
had to be distributed. 
117Dahl, 61. 
3. Condition III - The Level of Socioeconomic Development. 
Dahl assumed that "a high level of socioeconomic development not only favors the 
transformation of a hegemonic regime to a polyarchy but also helps maintain a polyarchy.""8 
He looked at the Gross National Product per capita of a country as one source to show 
socioeconomic development. He also confirmed that "there is unquestionably a significant 
association between socioeconomic level and political development."119 History shows that 
those countries with a high level of socioeconomic development have a more competitive 
regime. On the other hand, a country with a competitive regime seems to have a higher of 
socioeconomic development. 
Dahl also described the connection between socioeconomic development and 
political development. He stated that "the chances that a country will develop and maintain 
a competitive political regime depend upon the extent to which the country's society and 
economy provide literacy, education and communication, create a pluralistic rather than a 
centrally dominated social order, and prevent extreme inequalities among the politically 
relevant strata of the country."120 
The 1994 World Book Atlas on Economy determined the worldwide levels of GNP per 
capita - a high level is $21,960, a middle level is $2,440, and a lower level is $390. On this 
measurement, El Salvador has moved from $800 GNP in 1984 to $1,770 in 1993. The 
calculated GNP per capita for 1993 puts El Salvador in the middle between the lower and 
the middle level of GNP per capita in the world. Based on this analysis, El Salvador rates 
a 3 for the level of socioeconomic development. 
4. Condition IV - Equalities and Inequalities. 
"A country with a hegemonic regime, and extreme inequalities in the distribution of 
key values reduce the chances that a stable system of public contestation will develop."121 
Dahl is referring to the extreme inequality in the distribution of key society values as income, 
wealth, status, knowledge, military prowess, and political resources. El Salvador relates to 
this extreme inequality when the oligarchy had control of the economy, politics, and the 







military separated from the oligarchy, and agrarian and economic reforms were carried out. 
In 1992, the peace accords also considered these inequality issues (Chapter VII of the Peace 
Accords). Despite the efforts of the government to solve these problems over the last two 
years, El Salvador seems to be far from solving them. 
Dahl also proposed that a polyarchy or near-polyarchy is vulnerable to the effects of 
extreme inequality.122 However, a system of competitive politics and polyarchy can manage 
to survive a high measure of inequality. This happens when "demands for greater equality 
do raise, a regime may gain allegiance among deprived groups by responding to some part 
of the demands, though not necessary all of them, or by responses that do not reduce the 
objective inequalities but do not reduce feelings of relative deprivation." In El Salvador, the 
government has tried to comply with topics related to the economic and social reforms, 
especially the distribution of land among ex-combatants from both parties (Chapter VII), but 
its efforts have fallen short and behind schedule. In the end, this situation has promoted a 
high level of relative deprivation. Based on the analysis above, El Salvador rates a 6 for 
objective equalities and inequalities; and a 7 for subjective equalities and inequalities. 
S. Condition V - Subcultural Pluralism. 
"Any dispute in which a large section of the population of a country feels that its way 
of life or its highest values are severely menaced by other segment of the population creates 
a crisis in a competitive system . . . historical record argues that the system is very likely to 
dissolve into a civil war or to be displaced by a hegemonic regime."123 Dahl noted that 
subcultures may be formed around economic and social classes, occupations and 
educational levels, or other characteristics that need not to be strictly related to ethnic, 
religious, or regional characteristics.124 For the sake of his analysis, Dahl referred to 
subcultural pluralism, to the presence of ethnic, religious, or regional subcultures with 
objective differences in language, religion, race, or physical stock. 
"A polyarchy is more frequently found in relatively homogeneous countries than in 
countries with a great amount of subcultural pluralism."125 Since gaining its independence 
from Spain in 1821, El Salvador has been a country with a single predominant subculture or 
,22Dahl, 103. 
,23Dahl, 105. 
124Dahl, 106, footnote 1. 
125Dahl, 108. 
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ethnic group. Salvadorans are tied to the Catholic Church and come from the same ethnic 
background. During the years of civil war, new religious beliefs were introduced into the 
country, but more than 90 percent of Salvadorans are still Catholic. Based on this analysis, 
El Salvador rates a 9 for subcultural pluralism. 
6. Condition VI - Domination by a Foreign Power. 
"The destiny of a country is never wholly in the hands of its own people."126 In some 
cases, domination by a foreign power is likely to come through economic pressure, military 
power, or diplomatic sanctions. It does not matter what regime is established in a country, 
national policy-makers must take in account the possible actions and reactions of policy- 
makers in other states. Dahl stated that "the actions of foreigners may and almost will have 
some impact on one or more of the conditions discuss in this analysis"127 and that "the 
actions of foreigners may drastically alter the options available to a regime without 
necessarily altering the form of the regime ... to the extent that the actions of foreigners 
reduce the options available to a country, the people lose the capacity to govern 
themselves."128 He agreed that a weak or temporary foreign domination is more favorable for 
the development of a polyarchy. 
The beginning of the civil war in 1979 marked the beginning of El Salvador's 
economic dependance. Foreign economic aid was needed to survive the destruction 
provoked by the armed conflict, although this economic aid was also tied to foreign military, 
social, and political demands. Indeed, Salvadoran policy-makers were pressured throughout 
the civil war by foreign actors' agendas. The economic aid received from 1979 to 1995 
creates a critical economic situation for El Salvador, because the external debt has grown 
to such an extent that the country cannot separate easily from foreign influence. Salvadoran 
policy-makers continue to be pressured by foreign actors tieing the hands of the Salvadoran 




128| Dahl, 190. 
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7. Condition Vil - Belief of Political Activist. 
"The beliefs of the political activists are a key stage in the complex processes by 
which historical sequences or subcultural cleavages, for example, are converted into support 
for one kind of regime or another."129 Dahl divided this condition into six characteristics. 
The first characteristic identified by Dahl was that "the greater the belief within a given 
country in the legitimacy of the institution of polyarchy, the greater the chances of polyarchy 
to believe in the institution of polyarchy means to believe, at the very least, in the 
legitimacy of both public contestation and participation."130 In El Salvador from 1932 to early 
1982, government legitimacy remained overshadowed by the oligarchical-military dominance 
and the rejection of free elections -- two elements that impeded legitimacy. After the free 
legislative elections of 1982, and with the military out of the political apparatus, the 
Salvadoran people began to believe in the legitimacy of the government. This belief was 
reinforced later with the presidential elections of 1984. Those individuals who remained 
isolated and alienated from the political system in the past were invited to participate in the 
political race. Today, most of the Salvadoran people accept the legitimacy of the elected 
government, although there are still some individuals who consider the government 
illegitimate. Based on this analysis, El Salvador rates a 7 for the beliefs of political activist 
on the legitimacy of national institutions. 
The second characteristic cited by Dahl, and accepted by various writers, is the 
importance of beliefs or attitudes toward authority. Harry Eckstein hypothesized that a 
"democratic regime will be more stable if the authority patterns in the government were 
'congruent' with the patterns in other institutions and associations in the country."131 To make 
the point in an extreme form, Dahl said that" if most of the individuals of a country believe 
that the only proper relation of people to their government is on® of complete hierarchy, of 
rulers to subjects, of command and obedience, the chances that the regime will be 
hegemonic are, surely, high."132 In El Salvador, hierarchic authority is not seen by political 
society, institutions and organizations as a facilitator for developing compromise solutions. 
They still believe that allowing the government to have its constitutional authority will promote 
129Dahl, 124. 
,30Dahl, 129. 
,31Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966), app. B (1961), and passim. 
2Dahl, 141. 
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more political conflict and less conciliation. Given this examination, Ei Salvador rates a 7 for 
the beliefs of political activist on the legitimacy of unilateral authority. 
Dahl's third characteristic is the expectations of the people about the effectiveness 
of different regimes in dealing with critical problems.133 Dahl stated that "since we are 
dealing with the beliefs of political activists or leaders, a 'problem' exists and is 'critical' if it 
is perceived as such by a significant proportion of activists or leaders."134 Dahl suggested 
that "expectations about governmental effectiveness can be a more or less fixed element in 
the political culture of a country . . ,"135 Then, beliefs about governmental effectiveness can 
be strongly influenced both by political socialization and by the way the performance of 
different regimes is perceived. They may reinforce, weaken, or alter prevailing beliefs about 
authority. If a government is perceive as effective, its success will enhance the prestige of 
the authority patterns it embodies. The reverse will happen if it fails. 
In El Salvador, beliefs of political activists or leaders about government effectiveness 
are tied to only one element, how well and soon the government solves national problems. 
If the government manages to solve the problems in a way that is accepted by the rest of 
political leaders, then the government is seen as effective. If the government fails, it is the 
fault of the government party. Governmental effectiveness is not seen by Salvadoran 
politicians as a group effort but rather as a party effort. Political socialization is far from 
being consolidated in El Salvador among political elites. Based on this analysis, El Salvador 
rates a 3 for the beliefs of political activist on the effectiveness of a polyarchy to resolve 
major problems. 
Dahl's fourth characteristic is "the extent to which members of a political system have 
trust and confidence in their fellow political actors."136 Moderated distrust is good for 
politicians, but not in the extreme. Dahl suggested at least three ways that mutual trust 
favors polyarchy and public contestation, while extreme distrust favors hegemony. In the first 
place, polyarchy requires two-way or mutual communication, and two-way communication 
is impeded when elites do not trust one another. Second, a certain level of mutual trust is 
required in order for people to join freely in order to promote their goals. And third, conflicts 
133Cf. Seymour Martin Lipset. Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), 78. 
,34Dahl, 144. 
,35Dahl, 145. 
136Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, Political Culture, 535. 
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are more threatening among people who distrust one another. Public contestation requires 
a good deal of trust in one's opponent: they may be opponents, but they are not implacable 
enemies.137 
In El Salvador, political distrust is a daily event among politicians. Twelve years of 
civil war did not change the attitudes, rather, it built a stronger feeling of political distrust. 
This behavior can be affirmed by visiting the National Legislative Assembly, the most 
distrustful forum of the country. A political opponent in El Salvador means nothing more than 
a political enemy. Elite's trust evolves only if political parties or an individual's interest have 
first priority. Consequently, the peace accords of 1992 cannot be contemplated as a sign of 
trust among Salvadoran political activists. Political trust is a non-existent condition in El 
Salvador. Given the distrustful behavior of political elites in El Salvador, it rates a 2 for the 
beliefs of political activist to trust others. 
The fifth characteristic presented by Dahl is cooperation and competition. Trust is 
obviously related to the capacity of the people to engage freely and easily in cooperative 
actions.138 As with trust, the inability to cooperate reduces the chances to obtain a polyarchy. 
Dahl suggested that "the relevant units for cooperation or conflict need not be individuals but 
aggregates-factions, parties, social classes, regions, and the like."139 Dahl proposed three 
different ways in which someone might view cooperation and conflict. "At one extreme, 
relations among actors may be viewed as a strictly competitive (zero-sum) game, where the 
central rule is: what you gain, I lose, and what I lose, you gain."140 Since everyone has 
everything to lose and nothing to gain by cooperating, political actors think that the best 
strategy to follow is strictly competition. In other words, an actor will fight to win completely 
on every issue rather than compromise or cooperate. The second view is strictly 
cooperative, "here the rule is: not only is there no conflict between us but our interest are 
identical or so intertwined that we stand to gain or lose together."141 Here the best political 
strategy is to cooperate completely with each other and avoid conflict by all means. The third 
137Dahl, 151. 
,38Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Attitudes Toward International Affairs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 





and final view sees actors' relationships as cooperative-competitive. "Conflict, competition, 
and cooperation are all viewed as normal aspects of social relationships which contribute to 
a healthy, vigorous, progressive society."142 
In El Salvador, the political environment can be categorized as strictly competitive. 
Generally, Salvadoran actors do not understand the meaning of the word cooperation and 
Salvadoran parties or individuals from all ideologies think that a political confrontation or 
conflict means nothing more than a zero-sum game. Often, they cannot agree on the rules 
of the political game and fail to understand that cooperation with an opponent may ensure 
a better political outcome. Salvadoran politicians often place their parties' or individual 
interests above the national interests. Based on the above analysis, El Salvador rates a 2 
for strictly competitive; a 3 for strictly cooperative; and a 2 for cooperative-competitive. 
In Dahl's sixth characteristic, compromise is seen as a belief necessary and desirable 
among political elites. Dahl affirmed that the important strategy in a conflict is to search for 
mutually beneficial solutions. Far from being a betrayal of principle, a compromise is 
essentially a good thing, and a spirit of compromise vital. 
In El Salvador, compromise is seen as a sign of political weakness. Since there is no 
sense of cooperativeness among Salvadoran actors, political compromise prevails among 
them. Their political strategy to reach a compromise is just a temporary behavior. Even the 
peace accords of 1992 seems to reflect this temporary compromise strategy. Salvadoran 
political compromises are deplored, cooperation is extremely difficult, and conflicts are more 
likely to go unsettled. As a result of the above analysis, El Salvador rates a 2 in the belief 
of political activists on the necessity and desire to compromise. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Table 1.2 shows a positive view of the prospects for democracy in El Salvador. Many 
other considerations cast doubt on the accuracy of that assessment. Table 1.2 delineates 
a range of conditions that need to be addressed to analyze the prospects for El Salvador's 
democratic future. To the writer, some of these conditions are more critical than others. For 
the sake of this study, political culture, political society and institutions must be studied, as 
must as socioeconomic development and economic policies, the military, and international 
2Dahl, 155. 
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influences. Addressing these conditions in this chapter allows one to be cautiously optimistic 
about the country's future. 
1. Political Culture 
El Salvador's political culture has a long history of brutal repression and absence of 
democratic tradition. One hundred years of oligarchic control (1837-1932) and fifty years of 
oligarchical-military alliance (1932-1982) frustrated the intentions of the Salvadoran people 
to achieve political representation through elections. This repression also denied the citizens 
the right to seek a greater voice in civil affairs. Political participation and inclusiveness of the 
people were limited and rigorously controlled throughout these two periods. 
The twelve year civil war erupted due to the denial of these basic social, political, and 
economic rights. The civil war only produced a more polarized Salvadoran society, more 
poverty, and more political disorder. Overcoming this legacy of repression and social 
polarization in the post war era will be one of the greatest challenges of the consolidation of 
democracy in El Salvador. Political society must play an important role in this post-war 
challenge. 
2. Political Society 
As Table 1.2 shows, political society is one of the major barriers to the consolidation 
of democracy in El Salvador. The skills, values, and strategies of political leaders have been 
defined as essential elements for the formation of democracy.143 Günther and Higley 
reaffirmed this statement by stating that: 
A key to the stability and survival of democratic regimes is the establishment 
of substantial consensus among elites concerning rules of democratic 
political game and the worth of democratic institutions. The establishment of 
this political consensus is the central element in the consolidation of new 
democratic regimes.144 
Today, this political consensus is far from being achieved. Politics is perceived by 
Salvadoran elites as a war rather than a bargaining process and political outcomes are seen 
a zero-sum, not positive. The skills, values, and strategies of Salvadoran politicians are 
143This is based on the concepts developed in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour martin Upset, ed., 
Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 14-15. 
1MGuntherand Higley, 3. 
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often geared toward party and individual interests. National interests are generally secondary 
in their agendas. 
Günther and Higley agreed that "no democratic regime is ever fully consolidated in 
the ideal-typical sense, democratic consolidation is best regarded as a process of 
adaptation/freezing of democratic structures and norms, which come to be accepted by part 
or all of civil society."145 A consolidated democracy must have a convergence of thoughts 
between political elites and the masses. The absence of this convergence brings about 
other types of political regimes which can fall within one of these three categories: 
unconsolidated democracy, stable limited democracy, and pseudo-democracy.146 El 
Salvador follows an unconsolidated democracy because "the trappings of procedural 
democracy exist and there is substantial mass participation, but there is no real elite 
consensus about democratic rules of the game and institutions," and "elites are instead 
disunified in the sense that they distrust and have little traffic with one another."147 The 
erratic implementation of the peace accords, the renewal of socio-political violence in San 
Salvador, the negative public statements made by elites representing the relevant sectors, 
are just a few examples of the unconsolidated democracy in El Salvador. 
In conclusion, the tendencies of political society in El Salvador appear to be harmful 
for the future. Political elites apparently believe that democracy can best protect the people's 
interests, achieve stability, and bring order to the polity. These values seem to disappear 
when politicians formulate strategies to develop national objectives. Salvadoran elites need 
to be more unified in the sense that they must leave behind the negative political legacies 
of the past. They cannot continue to see political outcomes as a war or in zero-sum terms; 
they need to build an environment of trust among themselves; they need to be more 
professional in the sense that they cannot continue to be politicos de oportunidad (politicians 
of opportunity or opportunists); and political parties cannot afford to be "antisystem parties". 
Antisystem parties are defined as "institutions that vote against constitutions or organize 
boycotts of constitutional referenda; they regularly condemn the regime and articulate their 
vision of the alternative regime they seek; and they often try to subvert existing institutions, 
145Gunther and Higley, 4. 
,46For more information refer to Günther and Higley, 6-7. 
147Gunther and Higley, 5. 
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even when elected to serve in them."1'18 They often criticize the government, but they do little 
to improve it. Instead, they promote social and political unrest. El Salvador cannot move 
toward a consolidated democracy when those who run the country lack professionalism, 
consensus, and political committed. If there is no political will and commitment to overcome 
their own problems, they cannot guide the country toward a democratic consolidation. 
Politicians agreed in the peace accords to strengthen the state so that a great majority of the 
population can fully accept its legitimacy. As reconciliation progresses and external actors 
reduce their involvement, the state's legitimacy seems to be weakening, and a sector of the 
Salvadoran political society appears to reinforce this situation. 
3. Socioeconomic Development 
The basic needs of the Salvadoran population, depleted during the oligarchical- 
military period and further increased during the armed conflict demand prompt and effective 
attention. Despite the efforts by former President Cristiani and his successor, Calderon Sol, 
the socioeconomic development of the country has been criticized as a laissez-faire 
approach that favors the wealthy and places the costs of adjustments on the shoulders of 
the neediest sectors of the population.149 The economic reforms established by the past two 
administrations are questioned by their level of commitment and they are likely to be 
inadequate for the severe problems facing Salvadoran society. 
Several of these problems are: 
1. The number of Salvadorans living in extreme poverty is 30% in 1993. This 
poverty is especially severe in rural areas.150 
2. More than 41 % of the population do not have basic sanitation.  Potable water is 
accessible to 55% of the population.151 
3. Infant mortality is 50 for each 1000 individuals and most of these mortalities are 
related to either infectious diseases or malnutrition.152 
1
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'"Interview with opposition leaders. La Prensa Grafica Newspaper, 21 February 1995. 
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4. More than 27% of the population over 15 years old is illiterate and on average, 
each Salvadoran attends school for 4.32 years.'53 
5. The   level  of GNP  per capita  is  not  sufficient to  promote  the  needed 
socioeconomic development. 
6.    More than 42% of the population is without access to health services 154 
By signing the peace accords, the government and the FMLN affirmed that one of the 
prerequisites for democratic consolidation is the sustained economic and social development 
of the country.155 The end of the war prevented further decline in living standards and 
improved the economy, especially after the transfer of military spending to social welfare. 
Nevertheless, serious disputes over economic and social agreements have arisen, especially 
over land tenure. 
The country is in need of long-term international support at a time when demands are 
greater than the limited pool of funds available. Salvadorans need to learn how to solve their 
own problems because international support is not a lifetime warranty. Socioeconomic 
problems can be resolved by Salvadorans only if political society formulates and implements 
national strategies aimed to overcome these problems. In order for national policy-makers 
to develop such strategies, a total overhaul of the government and its bureaucratic agencies 
is required. Political elites need to prioritize national interests rather than their party and 
individual interests. The restructuring and the modernization of the state is another future 
challenge of Salvadoran elites. 
4. The Military 
After the full implementation of the peace accords related to the armed forces, the 
power of officers who opposed the peace talks diminished. The hard-liners in the military 
were marginalized from the rest of the organization. Now, the leading officers have become 
more pragmatic because they recognize the need for a more professional role in society. 
They are also preparing for the future because they cannot prevent the democratic changes 
in the country. Today, the military leadership is not full of reconstructed democrats, rather, 
153FUSADES, 4. 
154FUSADES, 12. 
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most officers decided to compromise with these changes because they believed them to be 
the best way to protect their institutional interest. 
In the end, the armed forces accepted their reduced role in society as provided by the 
peace accords and the Constitution. The armed forces are becoming more professional and 
more apolitical. The presence of the military does not represent a major barrier to the 
consolidation of democracy in Ei Salvador. Civil society needs to understand that the 
Salvadoran armed forces do not challenge the democratic system, but rather it is the political 
society that causes that impression. The armed forces are nothing more than an instrument 
of the political apparatus. 
5. International Influence 
International cooperation with El Salvador will decrease in the upcoming years. The 
economic problems of the United States and other nations, the end of the Cold War, and the 
economic needs of Eastern European nations are factors that lower the priority of and 
attention to El Salvador's problems. The external economic aid to the country in the 1980s 
played a very important role because it rescued the chaotic economic situation. The 
reduction of external economic aid is not seen as a limitation to the economic growth of the 
country, instead, it will promote a more efficient use of internal resources. Therefore, the 
biggest challenge that economic elites have at this moment is to gradually substitute this 
external aid with national resources. Once again, political elites play an important role in the 
formulation of economic strategies. 
The complete implementation of the peace accords and the future of the country lie 
in the full acceptance by Salvadorans, especially the political society, of both the uncertainty 
and the certainty that characterizes democracy. "In a democracy, no party is able to 
intervene if the new power struggles are perceived as prejudicial to its interest. Yet, all 
parties secure a level of certainty in exchange: the knowledge that the political game will be 
played according to democratic rules."156 As the uncertainties of the political process 
become certainties, democracy will grow in El Salvador, and democracy will be 
consolidated. 




This study began by examining the socio-historical changes in El Salvador from the 
commercial revolution of 1870 through the political transition of 1984, As explained in 
Chapter II, from 1870 to 1979 El Salvador was an oligarchic-authoritarian republic in which 
political competition took place only among economic elite groups. The lower class was too 
large and the presence of the military as government and as institution was an element for 
the oligarchy to retain power. Also there was little room for any political expression. The 
expansion of the middle class in the 1970s and their demands for free elections made the 
military mediate between them and the economic elites. These events, together with a weak 
economy, ignited the cycle of violence in the 1970s and the civil war of the 1980s. 
From 1972 to 1981, El Salvador aspired to move toward a democratic system, but 
circumstances overshadowed these efforts. Stepan's paths to /^democratization explain the 
Salvadoran case. In 1972, the country followed Stepan's Path Six (Party Pact - with or 
without consociational elements), which failed due to the power and the imposition of the 
military regime. In 1979, Salvadorans once again tried to follow Stepan's Path Five (Society- 
led Regime Termination). The Left and other opposition parties led the lower and middle 
classes to diffuse massive violent protests. These actions were aimed at destroying the 
government's legitimacy. The "military-as-government" responded with repressive actions 
through the "military-as-institution." These repressive actions sparked Stepan's Path Four(c) 
(Redemocratization led by "Military-as-lnstitution"). Young military officers organized a coup 
in 1979 and overthrew the military regime. The coup established a reformist junta and the 
country returned to Stepan's Path Six (Party Pact). Here, opposition parties and the military 
united to lay the foundation for a more democratic El Salvador. Despite these political 
changes, there was one major barrier to cross - the civil war. 
The Salvadoran civil war developed due to political and social reasons. The FMLN 
stated that "even if radical changes had taken place in the country before 1979, the Left and 
the Communist Community believed that a revolution was the only viable solution to the 
Salvadoran crisis."157 
After the FMLN's final offensive in 1981, El Salvador's social and political life changed 
profoundly. The civil war exploded and Salvadoran and international elites began to search 
'Speech given by Joaquin Villalobos at a Pound-Table Conference "Peace and Reconciliation in El Salvador". 
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for alternatives to end the civil war. After this armed insurrection, political intentions to end 
the conflict appeared for the first time. This military action was unsuccessful and sparked 
the Left to develop a new general strategy - to end to the conflict over a negotiating table. 
During this period, Jose Napoleon Duarte's junta developed the first government political 
proposal to end the civil war. Neither the FMLN's proposal nor the government's proposal 
created a decisive process of negotiation. 
From 1981 to 1984, the civil war intensified. More than 40,000 Salvadorans died as 
a result of the civil war, and the bombs and the bullets did little to settle the country's crisis. 
Most of the Salvadoran population believed that since the armed conflict developed due to 
social and political reasons, its solution was not in the blood of the people but over a 
negotiating table. With the election of Duarte in 1984, a new era of peace talks began. 
President Duarte invited the FMLN-FDR to the negotiating table in 1984 in La Palma. This 
meeting united both parties over a negotiating table to resolve the conflict. 
Over a period of four years, Duarte tried to bring about peace through peace talks 
with the FMLN-FDR, but the negotiations were full of uncertainties. Despite Duarte's efforts, 
the outcome of his negotiations (1984=1989) was unsuccessful. When Alfredo Cristiani, the 
candidate of the right-wing ARENA party, won the presidential elections in March 1989, many 
observers feared that the hopes for El Salvador's peace and democracy would have to be 
postponed, if not abandoned. But in his inaugural speech, Cristiani put those fears to rest. 
Cristiani wanted a political settlement with the FMLN. A series of wide-ranging negotiations 
meetings between both parties began in 1989 and culminated with the signing of the peace 
accords in Mexico 1992. No one in the 1980s could have imagined that El Salvador's civil 
war would end in 1991 with a consensus in favor of nonviolence, democratic norms, and 
respect for human rights. 
As explained in Chapter III, if one is to measure why it was Cristiani, not Duarte, who 
managed to reach an elite settlement, one must look at the influential national and 
international variables of each negotiation period. The Salvadoran armed conflict brought 
in many outside actors: the United States, the former Soviet Union, regional influences (like 
Mexico and Venezuela), supporters of the FMLN (such as Cuba and Nicaragua), and some 
Western European powers. Some of these actors tried to micromanage El Salvador's crisis 
through diplomatic, economic and military means. But, in the end, it was the Salvadorans 
who decided their own destiny over a negotiating table. Peace finally came to El Salvador 
after twelve years, although, the civil war left the country in a worse crisis than the 1970s. 
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Because of the high cost of the civil war, in human and monetary terms, in 1992 El Salvador 
achieved peace through negotiated accords. 
With the signing of the peace accords in Chapultepec, Mexico in 1992, the 
Salvadoran government and the FMLN reaffirmed the Geneva agreements' goals: "To end 
the armed conflict through means of political negotiations at the shortest time possible; 
promote El Salvador's democratization; guarantee unrestricted human rights; and reunite the 
Salvadoran society."158 The signing of the peace accords also led the country to a new 
phase in its political history. The accords delineated the enlargement of the people's social 
and political expectations within a more democratic framework, and ended the civil war. The 
peace accords provided a blueprint for a more democratic El Salvador, but political 
maneuvering and arduous negotiations over implementation defined the new rules of the 
game. The problematic implementation process raised the question of whether the accords 
truly represented a social pact among Salvadorans, a temporary elite settlement, or a 
superficial consensus imposed by international actors.159 
Despite the efforts of ONUSAL and COPAZ to consolidate the pending accords, the 
implementation process remains full of uncertainties. As Chapter IV explains, important 
elements contributing to these problems include: (a) the dearth of adequate representation 
and knowledge of the government negotiating commission; (b) the lack of elite commitment 
or consensus to implement reforms; (c) the deficiency of competent verification mechanisms 
of ONUSAL and domestic bodies; (d) the inability of international actors to deliver on time 
technical, economic and human assistance; and (e) the reliance on international actors to 
resolve internal problems. 
It is essential that other nations, looking at El Salvador as an example for future 
conflict resolution, understand the nature of the problems that challenge the implementation 
of the pending peace accords so they can obtain a more democratic society, a sustainable 
peace, a firm elite settlement, and a more united political society than El Salvador. 
After the elections of 1994, Salvadorans learned that without a democratic system 
the country had little hope of overcoming the lethal legacies of authoritarianism, terrorism, 
subversion, and civil war. Today, Salvadorans also understand that without the full 
implementation of the pending accords, the consolidation of El Salvador's democracy can 




never be achieved. Even now that the civil war has ended, many political analysts view the 
consolidation of El Salvador's democracy as an extremely laborious process. As Chapter 
V explains, despite this criticism, one can conclude, via Dahl's analysis, that a positive view 
for democracy in El Salvador exists. Many other circumstances cast doubt on the accuracy 
of this assessment. Dahl's analysis gave the chance to examine a range of conditions 
needed to guide El Salvador's democratization. For the sake of this study, political culture, 
political society and institutions must be examined, as must socioeconomic development and 
economic policies, the military, and international influences. The goal of addressing these 
conditions is to allow one to be cautiously optimistic about El Salvador's future. 
Obviously, the full implementation of the pending accords and the future of the 
country depend on the acceptance by Salvadorans, especially political society, of the new 
"rules of the game." As these rules become institutionalized, democracy will grow in El 
Salvador and democratic consolidation will be reached. 
With this study in mind, other nations must view El Salvador not as a model (a step- 
by-step guide) but as an example for conflict resolution. Each nation has particular political, 
social, economic and military characteristics, and influential variables that might require a 
different approach to formulate its own conflict resolution. Those unique characteristics 
should be considered in applying, in a flexible manner, some of the lessons learned in the 
Salvadoran case. 
APPENDIX A. 
The Negotiation Meetings (1984-1992). 
I. President Duarte's Negotiation Period (1984-1989).1 
The meeting of La Palma (15 October 1984). 
On October 8, 1984, President Duarte's speech to the United Nations delineated a peace 
initiative, and invited the FMLN-FDR to the first in a series of peace talks of 15 October 1984. 
Duarte's peace initiative had two objectives: to discuss a detailed negotiation process that would 
incorporate the FMLN's combatants into El Salvador's democratic system and to invite the Left to 
participate in the upcoming elections. Duarte's initiative came about after a series of proposals 
and mediation offers made by various national and international actors between 1981 and 1984. 
The outcome of this meeting was the creation of a mixed negotiating commission responsible for 
the analysis of the peace proposals presented by both parties, the development of a mechanism 
by which all segments of the Salvadoran society could be incorporated into the peace process, 
and the study of a plan by which peace could be reached in a short time. 
The meeting of Ayagualo (30 November 1984). 
During this initial meeting, the government and the FMLN presented their basic demands. 
The government proposed steps to humanize and reduce the level of conflict. President Duarte 
asked for the elimination of assassinations, kidnaping, threats, attacks in rural and urban cities, 
and reprisals against the families of government and armed forces personnel. He also demanded 
an end to the sabotage and destruction of private property, commercial and industrial 
establishments, and government property. 
As a counter-proposal, the FMLN-FDR presented their Propuesta Global de Solucion 
Politica Negociada para la Paz (Broad Proposal of Negotiated Political Solution for Peace) in 
which they outlined three separate phases. Phase one called for the creation of political 
conditions and basic individual rights to find a negotiated solution, an agreement to promote 
human rights, the elimination of United States influence, and the cessation of an arms buildup. 
Phase two demanded the suppression of hostilities against the insurgents, the participation of 
the FMLN-FDR in the government, a discussion regarding the cease-fire agreement, and the 
1The information regarding each of the meetings during President Duarte was gather by the writer from 
varios Salvadoran newspapers, microfilms, and magazines. 
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return of thousands of FMLN refuges. Finally, phase three called for constitutional reforms, a 
reorganization of the armed forces, and the announcement and scheduling of national elections. 
With the framework of this negotiation meeting, the FMLN returned to the countryside and 
restructured its revolutionary strategy. The FMLN developed a new strategy that allowed its 
guerrilla units to confront the armed forces in terms of a conventional war. In 1984, the FMLN 
organized its combatant units around military-strategic areas in which the FMLN's General 
Command planned to concentrate their military actions. The FMLN's strategy of organizing mass 
demonstrations became a second priority for the Command. Despite the increase in logistical 
support from Cuba and Nicaragua, guerrilla units felt harmed by the Armed Forces. The United 
States supplied the training and the weapons to direct effective military operations against the 
FMLN's concentrations. 
Evidently, the guerrillas could not afford to fight in a conventional war. Therefore, the 
FMLN formulated a new military strategy that aimed to use mass demonstrations in conjunction 
with military actions, as was done in the early 1980s. With these activities, social agitation 
increased from 1984 to 1986 and the peace talks were stopped. 
This meeting was a new negotiation attempt but it failed due to the absence of the 
FMLN's delegation. In late 1986, the FMLN presented a new negotiation strategy to the 
Salvadoran media called Oferta Politics del FMLN-FDR (Political Offer of the FMLN-FDR). Here, 
the Left demanded a search for the means of conflict resolution, an opening of political 
participation in the government, a cease-fire, and the respect for human rights.  During this year, 
the FMLN developed a new war strategy called Contra-Ofensiva (Counter-Offensive) which 
established action lines for its military units and mass organization. With the use of political and 
labor movements, the counteroffensive was framed in a deepening of the military activities and 
mass demonstrations. These mass activities had the goal of creating an environment of 
insurrection in the capital, and than carrying out violent actions. These types of actions 
increased in 1987 but the government neutralized them. This caused the FMLN to suffer a blow 
in its action lines, and obligated the mass demonstrations tactic to accelerate.  Due to the loss of 
the armed forces presence around the country, the FMLN's grew stronger there. 
By early 1987, the FMLN-FDR general strategy was divided into two main alternatives: 
The Extended Popular War and the Negotiated Agreements. Each of these alternatives had 
different characteristics. The Extended Popular War had the military objective to obtain force 
accumulation. The negotiation alternative became a parallel strategy to the military and the mass 
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actions. The involvement of the FDR in this strategy was to achieve political integration to win 
popular elections in 1989. Evidently,  in 1987 the FMLN was committed to a military solution and 
the FDR preferred a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. This division prevailed throughout 
the negotiation process during Duarte's peace talks. 
By mid-1987, two political events took place in the country that had great relevance for 
the political structure. First, on May 26, the FMLN-FDR announced a double proposal to 
President Duarte and the High Command of the Armed Forces that outlined the idea of a political 
solution. Second, on August 7, Los Acuerdos de Esquipulas II (The Agreements of Esquipulas 
II)2 were signed by the Central American presidents. These agreements contained new elements 
that influenced the peace talks. The most relevant were: a debate initiative with ail unarmed 
national groups of political opposition with those that had accepted the amnesty. The creation of 
a National Reconciliation Commission that would verify all aspects of the reconciliation process, 
and would also monitor the fulfillment of the agreements related to the amnesty, the cease-fire, 
the democratization process, and the upcoming elections. Finally, the agreements called for the 
cessation of aid to irregular forces . 
The Meeting of San Salvador (4-5 October 1987). 
The peace talks between the Government and the FMLN-FDR resumed in the 
headquarters of the Apostolic Church. In this meeting, both parties agreed to create two 
commissions to seek and prepare accords related to a cease-fire process and other aspects of 
Esquipulas II. There were no concrete agreements between both parties at this point and another 
meeting was scheduled to continue the discussions. 
The Meeting of Caracas (21-23 October 1987). 
In this meeting, the Government and the FMLN-FDR did not come to an agreement. By 
October 21, delays existed when both commissions discussed the norms by which to carry out 
the cease-fire. As a result, a new meeting was scheduled to be held in Mexico on the 22th. The 
FMLN, though, ceased the peace talks due to the assassination of the non-governmental 
Commission of Human Rights representative. The government delineated a policy of 
nonviolence, pardon and forgiveness. The rebels were urged to accept the arrangements and the 
spirit of Esquipulas II, a cease-fire and amnesty, to disarm and to incorporate in the political 
2AII the presidents from Central America got together in Guatemala and formulated these accords to promote 
democratic systems in the region through economic, social, cultural, and political treaties. 
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democratic process. On the other hand, the FMLN-FDR demanded a government reorganization 
that incorporated all social sectors that favored a political solution. This newly organized 
government would promote the conditions for free elections. 
In Esquipulas II, the Central American presidents established a period of 90 days for the 
agreements to emerge. The purpose of this measure was to search for El Salvador's 
reconciliation, but concrete results were not obtained. However, despite the limited 
improvements of the peace talks, the government promoted an amnesty and a unilateral cease- 
fire that went into effect on 5 November 1987. The FMLN also declared a unilateral cease-fire. 
In 1988, the FMLN-FDR introduced a new proposal called Ofensiva Diplomatica 
(Diplomatic Offensive). This proposal sought to increase international support in favor of the 
FMLN, and to prevent ARENA'S victory in the presidential elections of 1989. By the beginning of 
1989, the FMLN had redefined its military strategy and the possibilities of a new military offensive 
were evident. 
On 23 January 1989, the FMLN, before the presidential elections of March, presented a 
proposal aimed at converting the elections into a contribution to the peace process. They asked 
to postpone the elections to September 15, 1989, and demanded the following: an end to the 
repression by the armed forces; the keeping of the armed forces in their quarters; the integration 
of the Democratic Convergence to the Central Electoral Council; and the promulgation of a new 
Electoral Code. They also demanded the right of voting to those Salvadorans living outside the 
country.  If these demands were answered, the FMLN promised to respect the activities of the 
political parties, to declare a two-day truce before and after the elections, and to accept the 
electoral result of September elections. 
In this framework, the government accepted the FMLN-FDR's demands except for the 
postponement of the elections. This answer motivated the FMLN to stop and boycott the 
presidential elections. This action did not succeed, though, due to the response of the vast 
majority of the population who went to the polls. This popular response motivated the FMLN to 
promote an end to the civil war through a political settlement, and to retreat from its military 
commitment. In March 1989, President Duarte passed the government to the newly elected 
President Alfredo Cristiani. 
II. President Cristiani's Negotiation Process (1989-1992). 
The meeting of Mexico (September 1989).3 
At this meeting, the FMLN-FDR, through Commander Joaquin Villalobos, announced its 
proposal called Propuesta para Encontrarla Democratization (Proposal to Achieve a 
Democratization).  It also called for the cessation of hostilities and the lasting peace in El 
Salvador.  This proposal had three important components: an observance of a cease-fire starting 
on 15 September 1989; an initial phase for the incorporation of the FMLN; a definitive end of the 
armed conflict; and the total integration of the FMLN to the political life starting 31 January 1990. 
The Government proposed to create a negotiation commission with a permanent 
character whose purpose was to develop activities related to the peace process. At the end of 
this meeting, both delegations signed an agreement called Acuerdos de Mexico (Accords of 
Mexico). In this agreement both parties were committed to carry out permanent peace talks with 
maximum seriousness, reciprocal guarantees, and an efficient framework to achieve a conflict 
resolution. 
The Meeting of San Jose (16-17 October 1989). 
Prior to this meeting, military actions on both sides increased throughout the country. The 
FMLN disregarded the agreement to cease sabotage activities, and increased its military 
campaign. Since the meeting in Mexico, the debate was full of tension, political violence, and 
urban terrorism. Acts of sabotage increased in the capital and the FMLN developed a campaign 
against what they called the repressive actions of the ARENA government and the Armed 
Forces. 
In San Jose, the FMLN arrived with the same negotiation agenda as proposed in Mexico 
along with two additional points: (1) the measures for the auto-purge and the professional 
education of the armed forces; and (2) judicial system reforms. The proposal of the government 
mentioned a cease-fire and the end of sabotage actions. But these topics did not prosper due to 
the irrational procedures presented by both parts to end the armed conflict. After this meeting, 
violence increased dramatically. 
Meetings scheduled for the 20th and 21st of November 1989 in Caracas were not held 
because the FMLN launched an insurgent offensive. The FMLN declared publicly that this 
offensive developed because the negotiation process was full of disputes. 
3El Diario de Hoy Newspaper, San Salvador: El Salvador, 01 October 1989, pg. 2. 
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The FMLN Offensive (11 November 1989). 
This offensive was named Fuera los Facistas, Febe Elizabeth Vive (Expel the Fascist, 
Febe Elizabeth Lives). This offensive had four objectives. First, it aimed to stop the 
socioeconomic programs developed by President Cristiani.  Second, it tried to reinforce the 
repressive image of the armed forces. Third, it sought to generate an image of strength for the 
FMLN, and finally, it attemptedto create dissatisfaction against the government.4 
The armed forces responded quickly to this armed insurrection and managed to control 
the situation. The FMLN failed to reach their objective for two primary reasons. First, they never 
had the support of the population. Second, the combatant units of the FMLN were not prepared 
to fight in the streets of San Salvador. The Salvadoran people clearly announced to the FMLN 
that they were tired of the war. Civil society demanded that the FMLN incorporate itself into the 
political process of the country, and to resolve the armed conflict over the negotiating table. This 
popular reaction obligated the FMLN to resume the peace talks with the government.5 
The Debate Efforts after the Offensive. 
It was fair to think that the effects of this offensive would create a hostile climate among 
the negotiating parties.  However, President Cristiani proposed to begin the peace talks in 
December of 1989 under one condition - that the FMLN stop all terrorist actions against the 
civilian population.  In Costa Rica, the presidents of Central America expressed their total 
support for the government of El Salvador and condemned the FMLN for their offensive. Within a 
setting of international negotiation proposals, both delegations requested the participation of the 
United Nations in the peace talks. With the participation of the United Nations, the peace talks 
developed in a different framework. This new dialogue framework evolved from the impact that 
the offensive had on all Salvadorans, the acceptance of the peace talks by the U.S. Government, 
the mediation of the Secretary-General of the U.N. Javier Perez de Cuellar, the flexible proposals 
of the FMLN, and the pressure from national and international organizations. 
After 10 years of civil war, the FMLN sensed that a negotiated solution was the only 
viable way to end the armed conflict. Thus, the FMLN called for the establishment of a social, 
political, and economic regime that would assure the fulfillment of the will of the Salvadoran 
people. The objective of this regime was to maintain and to reproduce a democratic system with 
the consensus of the Salvadoran people. With this framework, the government and the FMLN 
"Ruben Zamora, "For El Salvador: Democracy Before Peace." New York Times. 24 January 1990, A15. 
5La Prensa Grafica, 10 November 1989, pg. 1. 
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resumed the peace talks. 
The meeting of Geneva (04 April 1990).6 
In this meeting, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN established an agreement. 
The purposes of this agreement was to end the armed conflict by a political route in a short 
period, to encourage the democratization of the country, to guarantee the respect for human 
rights, and to reunify the Salvadoran society. 
The initial goal was to achieve political agreements that would cease the armed 
confrontation and all activities that jeopardized the rights of the population. These agreements 
were to be verified by the United Nations and approved by the Security Council. The medium- 
term goal was to establish the guarantees and necessary conditions for the incorporation of the 
FMLN combatants to the civil, institutional, and political life of the country. The methodology was 
that the government and the FMLN would develop a dialogue between both parties with the 
mediation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative, and that the 
Secretary-General would assure that the peace talks were contributing to the success of the 
negotiation process. The government and the FMLN would assure that their representatives had 
the authority to discuss and formulate agreements. 
The conditions of this agreement were that the government and the FMLN agreed on a 
private peace process. The Secretary-General or his representative was the only authorized 
person to provide public information. The Secretary-General, in discreet form, would maintain 
confidential communication with the U.S. Government, with members of the United Nations, or 
with other organizations that could contribute to the success of the peace talks. The government 
and the FMLN agreed that the national political parties and social organizations had an important 
role in the consolidation of the peace.  Both parties identified the need to establish and maintain 
consultation mechanisms with such organizations. 
The meeting of Caracas (16-20 May 1990). 
For this meeting, the agendas of the government and the FMLN continued to be the 
same. However, they outlined a new perspective: the total search for a negotiated solution. Both 
parties continued to promote their efforts to achieve the end of the armed conflict through 
negotiations. 
6Transcript of documents, Geneva, 04 April 1990. 
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The meeting of Oaxtepec, Mexico (19 June 1990). 
This meeting centered on the purge of the armed forces that later became a strategy of 
the FMLN to promote a stalemate in the negotiation process. The proposal of the FMLN sought 
to reduce the size of the military. The government accepted this proposal contingent upon the 
demobilization of the FMLN units. The fundamental issue of this meeting was not to reduce but 
to purge the armed forces. The FMLN viewed this condition to be necessary for the 
democratization of the country.7 
The purge of the armed forces became a preoccupation for some national and 
international political sectors, especially the U.S. Congress. This topic was the most 
controversial of the agenda, and was the reason that greater advances in the negotiations failed 
to take place. 
The Negotiation Proposals in San Jos® I. II and ill Üulv-September 19901s 
In San Jose I (Costa Rica), the government proposed a transformation of the Armed 
Force's doctrine and their new role in the democratic system. The government also accepted 
and supported the judicial process surrounding the investigation of several assassinations that 
occurred in previous years. 
The FMLN continued to emphasize the topic related to the purging of the armed forces. 
Its intention was to stop the corruption of military officers and the taking of command posts by 
officer's tandas (graduating class). The Government provided assurance that the purging of the 
armed forces would take place after the FMLN had been disarmed and demobilized. The 
meeting ended with a signed agreement establishing the mechanisms to monitor human rights 
under the United Nations through an organization later known as ONUSAL 
In San Jose II and III, the FMLN again stressed the disappearance of the armed forces. 
Concrete agreements were not obtained and this failure caused the debate to lose credibility. 
This also contributed to the continuation of the armed confrontation.  Despite the frustration of 
these meetings, both commissions considered that the negotiation process should continue. 
The Offensive of Movember 1880, 
Despite President Cristiani's speech to the United Nations (October 1990) to continue 
7La Prensa Grafica Newspaper interview with Joaquin Villalobos, member of the FMLN negotiation 
commission, 23 June 1990, pg. 1. 
"Transcript of documents, San Jose: Costa Rica, 26 July 1990. 
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with the peace talks, the FMLN launched a new military offensive in November. This offensive 
had a lower level of intensity and duration than the one in 1989. The FMLN argued that this 
offensive had the purpose of reenergizing the negotiation process. Again, the FMLN's military 
offensive did not achieve its objectives for lack of support from the population. 
Due to this armed insurrection, the negotiations stopped and the peace process was put 
in danger.  However, the Secretary General of the United Nations brought both parties to the 
negotiation table.  Between December of 1990 and January of 1991, he held private meetings 
with both negotiating commissions. At the end of these private meetings, the Secretary General 
announced that the peace talks would resume immediately.9 
The meeting of Managua (March 1991). 
By early 1991, the FMLN understood that its Marxist-Leninist goals could not be reached 
by means of force.  Moreover, the FMLN presented in Managua, before the Commission of the 
European Economic Community and the Foreign Relation Ministers of Central America, an 
initiative to accelerate the peace talks. This proposal discussed the fundamental topics of the 
agenda of Caracas, 1989, especially those topics that related to the armed forces, constitutional 
reforms, and a cease-fire. This peace initiative was accepted by the government, and the 
process continued without major problems. 
The meeting of Mexico (April 1991). 
In this meeting, both sides agreed on reforms to the Constitution that related to the armed 
forces, the judicial system, human rights, and the electoral process. These reforms were 
presented to the Legislative Assembly after the agreement was reached in Mexico. An execution 
calendar or time line was also created to ratify these reforms. Several items related to the armed 
force were left pending due to the refusal of the FMLN to go on with its disarmament and 
demobilization. 
In this meeting, the Truth Commission was created whose responsibility was to 
investigate the most prominent acts of violence since 1980. The Commission was to be formed 
with three civilians appointed by the Secretary General of the U.N. and accepted by both 
negotiating parties. 
There were four major agreements at this meeting. The first agreement concerned the 
subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian power; the creation of a State Intelligence 
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organization; the restructuring of the military justice regulation; and the proposng of laws that 
relate to paramilitary groups, recruitment and public security forces. 
Second, the judicial system must be reorganized along with the laws related to the form 
of choosing the Supreme Court Judges. The election of these judges would be approved by two- 
thirds of the Legislative Assembly. Third, human rights laws would be based on the agreements 
signed in San Jose I. A National Attorney for the defense of the human rights would be appointed 
and would be elected by two-thirds of the Legislative Assembly.  Forth, the electoral system 
would be restructured. The Inter-party Dialogue Commission would be created to address these 
reforms, and it would serve as an important base for debate and cooperation across the political 
spectrum.10 
The meeting of Carabalieda, Venezuela (May 1981). 
This meeting was a continuation of the previous one. However, it tried to give more 
emphasis to those pending topics related to the armed forces and to the cessation of the armed 
conflict. The meeting concluded with few advances; but, it showed the will of both parties to 
arrive at a negotiated solution. 
The meeting off Queretaro, Mexico (June 1991). 
Once again, the topics discussed were related to the armed forces and the cease-fire. In 
relation to the Armed Forces, the government said that they would be reorganized to fit in the 
new Salvadoran democratic system. The government again recognized that the armed forces 
would be subordinated to civilian authorities, and that the agreements related to this topic were 
necessary for the pacification of the country. Based on this, the FMLN took an apparently flexible 
attitude, agreeing to discuss those topics already mentioned.  However, they only discussed 
those aspects dealing with public security forces, and the cease-fire. Other pending topics were 
a source for later discussion. 
The meeting of Mexico (July 1991). 
The FMLN again continued to extend the course of the negotiation by evading the final 
agreements on topics related to the armed forces and the cease-fire. The FMLN argued that 
there were specific points in the topics of the armed forces and the cease-fire that had not been 
resolved. At the end, the FMLN brought a new topic for discussion that broke the agenda 
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presented in Caracas. In sum, this meeting was unsuccessful. 
The meeting of New York (21 September 1991). 
After a stagnation of the peace talks created by unrealistic demands of the FMLN in 
Mexico, the negotiation process resumed through the exigency of the United Nations. However, 
this time it included the participation of the Secretary-General of the U.N. and President Cristiani. 
Cristiani was present solely to have an interview with the Secretary-General, given that 
his governmental commission would meet with the commission of the FMLN. The agreements of 
New York changed the plan settled on in Caracas and were based on the negotiation process, 
the cease-fire, and the disarmament and demobilization of the FMLN.  Both parties only 
discussed those.topics related to the negotiation of political agreements, the cease-fire, and the 
terms of the negotiation process. At the end, both commissions decided that a date for the 
cease-fire must be predetermined in a short period. 
In sum, it was agreed to create the National Commission for a Peace Consolidation 
(COPAZ), to purge the armed forces, to reduce the armed forces, to change the doctrine of the 
armed forces, to improve the educational system of the armed forces, and to create a Civilian 
National Police Force (CNP).11 
A new document was also signed known as Entendidos de Nueva York (Agreements of 
New York). The issues addressed in this proposal were the armed forces, the judicial system, the 
electoral system, and the ratification of constitutional reforms. These agreements also called for 
the conditions of a cease-fire, the political participation of the FMLN, the implementation of the 
peace agreements, and the participation of FMLN's ex-combatants in the CNP. The FMLN also 
agreed to drop its commitment to end the armed conflict by force. 
The meetings of Mexico (November 1991). 
The negotiations began here with the discussion of the public security doctrine and 
structure of the CNP. In these meetings, there were agreements of previous topics presented in 
other meetings.  During these meetings, the FMLN announced to the government commission 
that its armed units would not surrender their weapons to any one. Such an attitude obviously 
denied the will of the FMLN to end of the armed conflict. 
The agreements of Geneva clearly established that the purpose of the peace talks was to 
end the armed conflict by means of a political debate; something that could not be achieved 
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while the FMLN maintained its military structure. The FMLN, throughout the peace talks, used its 
military apparatus every time its general interests were threatened, to promote its position on 
certain issues. 
The meeting of New York (18 December 1991). 
The goal of this meeting was to reach a final agreement to end the armed conflict. With 
the presence of the Secretary-General, the meeting was a success. His presence gave 
dynamism to the negotiation process. Obviously, the Secretary General of the UN wanted to 
finish the peace talks before his term was over (31 December 1991). 
In this meeting, President Cristiani came to join the peace effort. His participation also 
accelerated the peace talks so that an agreement could be reached before the last day of 1991. 
The meeting of New York (31 December 1991). 
Here, the end of the armed conflict came with the signing of the document known as 
Acueräos de Nueva York (Agreements of New York).  In these agreements, the government and 
the FMLN declared a definite end to the Salvadoran armed conflict. The agreements also 
reflected the commitment of both parties to sign the Cese a el Enfrentamiento Armado de El 
Salvador (CEA - Cessation of the Armed Confrontationof El Salvador). The agreements also 
called for an end of the FMLN's military apparatus, the incorporation of its combatants to the 
socio-political system, and the reduction of the armed forces. 
Some commitments before the signing of the CEA were established. The government 
and the FMLN would meet again from the 5th to the 10th of January 1992 to negotiate the 
execution calendar of the agreements. If agreements did not exist by January 10, the U.N. would 
formulate a strategy to settle unresolved matters before the 15th of January. Finally, the formal 
signing of the CEA would be held on January 16 and it would be carried out from 1 February 
1992 until 31 October 1992.12 
Despite the Peace Accords of New York, FMLN's middle level commanders announced 
that they would not surrender their weapons to the government or to the armed forces. They 
would deliver their weapons to an international organization under the condition that they obtain 
power within the structure of the government. This event did not take place and the negotiation 
process continued as schedule. 
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The meeting of New York (06-10 January 1992). 
In this meeting, a document was signed known as New York II.  It included the details of 
the agreement signed on 31 December 1991 that would allow the final signing on 16 January 
1992. The FMLN behaved negatively and accused the government of using the armed forces to 
intimidate its combatants scattered around the country. This attitude delayed the negotiation 
process until 12 January. 
The final meeting of Mexico (16 January 1992). 
In Chapultepec, Mexico, the government of El Salvador and the FMLN signed the final 
document known as Los Acuerdos de Paz (The Peace Accords). These accords outlined the 
peace talks, the process of the FMLN's demobilization, the reincorporation of the FMLN, the 
constitutional reforms, the demobilization of the armed forces, and the economic and political 
opening of the country under the supervision of ONUSAL. 
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